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offered helpful advice on this Article and writing generally.
1. For an article that might be fairly titled "Fee Shifting and Sovereign Immunity
Before Seminole Tribe" and provides an excellent treatment of the topic,
particularly the Edelman problem discussed below, see Ernest A. Nagata,
Federal Powers and the Eleventh Amendment: Attorneys' Fees in Private Suits
Against the State, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1975).
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If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights [through acts
such as § 1983], and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover [from the state treasury] what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court. 2
[A] suit by private parties ... impos[ing] a liability which must be paid
from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh
3
Amendment.

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is an obvious tension between the two quotes-one from
Congress and one from the Court-that begin this Article on fee-shifting statutes. To start fleshing out a synthesis of that tension, I would
like to situate the problem in a practical context. Take the law enacted by Oklahoma barring the recognition of out-of-state adoptions
by same-sex couples. 4 Several affected couples sued in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 to invalidate the law, claiming that it violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV.6 In
Finstuen v. Crutcher, the district court enjoined enforcement of the
law on all three theories. 7 But, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the full
2. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at *2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5908, 5910.
3. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
4. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), affd in
part,rev'd in part sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
The complaint requested attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but neither
court addressed an award. Complaint at 10, Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (No.
CIV-04-1152-C). After prevailing in the district court, the plaintiffs did request
costs ($270.00), Bill of Costs at 1, id., and the Commissioner of Health of
Oklahoma, the nominal defendant in the case, did object, but not on grounds of
sovereign immunity. Objections to Assessment of Costs at 1, id. Instead, he contended that because he might prevail on appeal, it was premature to tax him.
The issue appears not to have been resolved on remand.
With costs, the amounts in controversy are so low and the custom of taxing
them so old, see, e.g., Winchester v. Jackson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 514 (1885) ("Costs
will be allowed upon a dismissal of a writ of error. . . ."), that I have not focused
on them in this Article. I see little reason, other than the patina of history (which
is analyzed more in section V.D), why cost-shifting statutes and court rules cannot be substituted everywhere attorneys' fees are mentioned in this Article other
than in section III.A. Costs are probably too minor to cause the types of practical
problems identified in that section.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
6. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1139.
7. Id. at 1156.
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faith and credit argument only.8 Wondering how this illustrates the
problem that I would like to introduce is forgivable.
The merits of Finstuen are interesting, but this Article focuses on
what, at first glance, seems like a tangential question: Could the Finstuen plaintiffs have collected attorneys' fees 9 from Oklahoma under
42 U.S.C. § 1988?1o The importance of that question is developed below. For the moment, take Finstuen as but one practical example of a
hidden problem in the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
After the Finstuen couples prevailed in the district court on their
Fourteenth Amendment claims, this Article assumes that an award of
attorneys' fees would have been unproblematic-Congress has the
power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from damages when it
acts pursuant to a post-Eleventh Amendment grant of constitutional
power, such as the Fourteenth Amendment. That is the upshot of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida." And, if the district court had the power to
award damages as a constitutional matter, 12 then there is little ques13
tion that an award of attorneys' fees should be permissible as well.
Attorneys' fees are in many ways simply costs incident to the prosecution of any suit, but an action for damages constitutes a specific form
of suit in Anglo-American jurisprudence-one that the Constitution
8. Id. at 1145.
9. Throughout this Article, I use the term "attorneys' fees" to refer to fees attendant
to a suit for injunctive relief brought in the first instance. The subsequent prosecution of a state or its officers for failure to comply with the provisions of an
injunction is not considered. Attorneys' fees in such a case are pretty clearly part
and parcel of an award of prospective relief. See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123,
126-31 (2d Cir. 1974). Also, the inherent power of the courts to award fees as a
deterrent to bad faith conduct is almost indisputable and will not be addressed
here. See generally Joan Chisper, Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad
Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 323-30 (1977) (grounding this power in
the reception by U.S. courts of the equity powers of the English courts, which
could order payment of fees for bad faith conduct even in the absence of statutory
authority).
10. The Finstuenplaintiffs pleaded a "substantial" Fourteenth Amendment question
in addition to their full faith and credit arguments, so Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S.
122, 133 n.16 (1980), would probably control the availability of fees. See infra
notes 126-28 and accompanying text. Maher solves some of the practical
problems that I identify later, but offers little insight into the conceptual problem
of a § 1983 action that asserts only pre-Eleventh Amendment claims. (As shorthand, I use "pre-Eleventh Amendment claims" to mean claims based on both preEleventh Amendment constitutional provisions and the statutes enacted by Congress under those provisions.)
11. 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996).
12. Note that damages would not have been available in fact, because § 1983 does not
create a damages remedy against states. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). My point is that Congress could have provided for damages as a constitutional matter and that it has so provided for attorneys' fees by
enacting § 1988.
13. But see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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treats differently from other actions (such as claims for injunctive relief).14 For reasons discussed in section III.B below, I assume for purposes of this Article that if Congress can constitutionally subject a
state to liability for damages, then there is no reason why Congress
cannot constitutionally provide for attorneys' fees.
With that wind-up, the problem lurking in Finstuen starts to come
into focus. The constitutional basis for Congress's power to provide
the couples with damages evaporated when the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the full faith and credit argument only. Seminole Tribe precludes an award of damages without a Fourteenth Amendment
claim15-not simply as a consequence of the textual specificity of
§ 1988 (or any statute)-but as a constitutional matter. This Article
asks whether cases about the constitutional contours of sovereign immunity, like Seminole Tribe and Edelman v. Jordan,16 put the Finstuen plaintiffs out of luck on attorneys' fees as well.
If so, the couples in Finstuen would seem to be-at least at first
glance-in a preposterous position. They could have been awarded attorneys' fees by the district court initially, but not on remand. Even
though the law that they challenged is, as a practical matter, just as
unconstitutional on remand as it was when the district court initially
enjoined its enforcement, the couples' incentive (or, depending on the
circumstances, even their ability) to bring the suit would depend on
which section of the Constitution entitles the couples to relief: the
pre- or the post-Eleventh Amendment Constitution. The Eleventh
Amendment17 would take on double duty as a dividing line in § 1983
14. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
15. This Article refers to the Fourteenth Amendment and post-Eleventh Amendment
constitutional provisions interchangeably for reasons of textual economy. There
are, of course, other post-Eleventh Amendment provisions that fall squarely
within Seminole Tribe's "the latter controls the former" reasoning and that also
include a textual basis for inferring the abrogation of states' immunity-for example, the Thirteenth, the Fifteenth, and the Nineteenth Amendments. All provide, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, that "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV,
XIX. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, is the most frequently litigated basis of post-Eleventh Amendments rights; and, it is the amendment under which
Congress most often acts (or attempts to act) to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, I have limited my discussion to it.
It is interesting to note that those amendments that protect "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), for whom access to the legal system is most difficult because of its high
cost (among other barriers), see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 86-87 (1980), are the same amendments that do not
present the problem identified in this Article. That thought is developed further
in section V.A.
16. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
17. The Eleventh Amendment reads, "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

2009]

FEE SHIFTING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

5

cases-it already determines whether damages are available. There
would be two Constitutions, one that impecunious citizens are incentivized (or, again, depending on circumstances, able) to enforce and
one that they are not. As developed in section III.A and Part V, such a
line may make sense for damage awards, but Seminole Tribe and
Edelman do not compel the creation of a new dividing line for attorneys' fees, and another judicially created partition of the Constitution
may not be desirable.
This Article asks two questions: (1) Is the constitutional availability of attorneys' fees from states limited by the constitutional availability of damages, and (2) what would be the effect of saying "yes"?
Those simple and straightforward questions defy an easy answer. In
Parts IV-VI of this Article, I attempt to work through several ways of
thinking about those problems to arrive at an account of what the
Court might do, what I believe it should do, and why struggling with
this problem is a valuable exercise.
The conceptual question-which is the central focus of this Article-is interesting in its own right, but it is dwarfed in importance by
the practical consequences that will flow from the answer that the
Court ultimately gives. If the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence before and after Seminole Tribe means that attorneys' fees are
no longer available to successful § 1983 litigants for claims that do not
arise under post-Eleventh Amendment causes of action,18 the impact
will be breathtaking. Fee-shifting regimes that have played an important part in private parties' enforcement of the Constitution and federal law will be significantly undermined. Awards of attorneys' fees
will be barred as a constitutional matter for actions that seek to enforce compliance with many federal laws, 19 such as those that concern
employment, 20 the environment,2 1 and commerce 2 2-as well as for acagainst one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity will be used interchangeably throughout to refer to state sovereign immunity even though to refer to an
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a technical misnomer; the modern Court holds
that the Constitution's structure provides the immunity, the Eleventh Amendment simply remedied the error in Chisholm. See e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 367 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 709, 713
(1999)).
18. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996).
19. The succeeding examples of federal law come from the "incomplete sample" of
such laws that Justice Powell identified as newly actionable by the Court's reading of the "and laws" provision of § 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23,
34-37 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Slightly more esoteric statutes implicated
include the Federal Noxious Weed Act and the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act. Id. at 34-35.
20. See, e.g., Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49
(2006).
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tions raising supremacy, 23 suspension, 2 4 full faith and credit, 2 5 and
dormant commerce 2 6 claims. 2 7 In fact, the reach of the problem identified in this Article extends into some of the most important areas of
federal regulation, because Congress has frequently adopted fee-shifting regimes when it saw fit to construct an extensive regulatory
2
apparatus. S
Part II begins with a treatment of both the practical concerns and
conceptual context of the problem of fee awards against states by providing brief, and no doubt familiar, histories of the statutes and principles at issue.
II.
A.

(VERY) BRIEF HISTORIES

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
also called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, as part of its "Radical Recon29
struction" of the southern states that seceded during the Civil War.
Section 1983 was designed to provide a federal remedy to citizens of
southern states, particularly newly emancipated African Americans
and their white supporters, who were frequent targets of organized
intimidation by white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan. 3o Federal protection was necessary because white supremacist
groups were often in cahoots with the executive, legislative, and judi21. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1863 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11502(a)(2) (2006).
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
26. For a thoughtful treatment of § 1983's use as a vehicle for Dormant Commerce
Clause claims, see generally Stephen K. Schutte, Doctrinal Foundationsof Section 1983 and the Resurgent Dormant Commerce Clause, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1249
(1992). For purposes of this Article, Professor Schutte's recognition that the seminal case in this area, Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), allowed for attorneys' fees is important. Id. at 1252. He used the availability of fee awards as one
factor in his prediction that there would be an explosion of Dormant Commerce
Clause cases after Dennis. See id.
27. Other litigated grounds for relief arising out of pre-Eleventh Amendment constitutional provisions include the Ex Post Facto and the Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. art. IV, § 2.
28. See infra section II.B.
29. See JAMIE KATHRYN LANSFORD, COMMENT: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE Ku
KLux KLAN ACT OF 1981-AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IN SECTION 1983: SWORD
AND SHIELD 23-42 (Robert H. Freilich & Richard G. Carlisle eds. 1983).
30. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972); Brian Buckley, Comment,
Washington Courts Get Stingy: Improper Denial of Attorney's Fees Under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 70 WASH. L. REV. 491, 492-93 (1995); Note, Attorney's
Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875, 1876 (1975) [hereinafter Attorney's Fees].
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cial organs of the states. 3 1 The purpose of the Act, in the Supreme
Court's now classic formulation "was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 3 2 In many respects, this turned the traditional concern of federalism-that the federal government might become too strong-on its
head by recognizing that the federal government had become too weak
to protect the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment without providing access to impartial courts. 33 The Court has recognized that
§ 1983 disturbs the ordinary balance of state and federal power by
holding, for example, that § 1983 is sufficiently explicit to overcome
the presumption, codified in the Anti-Injunction Act,34 that the federal courts should not act to restrain state judicial proceedings. 3 5
It seems clear from above that the original understanding of § 1983
intended for it to help protect civil rights and to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, the Act languished until the Bill of Rights
was incorporated against the states and the Court concluded that
"under color of state law" reaches actions by state officers acting contrary to state law. 36 The rehabilitation of § 1983 was in large measure an accident; the most significant development that enhanced its
usefulness was a slight change introduced several years later. During
the codification by Congress in 1874, the wording of the statute was
changed to read, "Any person who.., shall subject.., any person...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall . . . be liable to the party injured." 37
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court-over a vigorous dissent written by
Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and then Justice
Rehnquist-read the addition of "and laws" literally: the majority extended to plaintiffs a § 1983 cause of action for the violation of any
31. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240.
32. Id. at 242 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
33. See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345 ("[Tlhese amendments ....
were
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States and
enlargements of the power of Congress.... It is these [Reconstruction-era amendments] which Congress is empowered to enforce ....

34.
35.

36.
37.

Such enforcement is no

invasion of State sovereignty. No law [enacted under them] can be [either]."); cf.
LANSFORD, supra note 29, at 23-42 (describing the changes after enactment of
§ 1983).
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242-43. But cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54
(1971) (cobbling together a judicially created abstention doctrine that serves as
an exception to the § 1983 exception to the Anti-Injunction Act for certain parallel claims that touch on sensitive areas of state control, such as the enforcement
of criminal laws).
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-72 (1961), overruled on other grounds
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
See Fed. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1878) (emphasis added).
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federal statute, in addition to the well-established cause of action for
violations of the Constitution. 38
Many of the § 1983 actions that present the problem identified in
this Article arise out of that reading of "and laws" in Thiboutot. The
"and laws" actions that arise from the violation of a statute enacted
pursuant to Congress' Article I powers, e.g., through the Commerce
Clause, present pre-Eleventh Amendment claims for which injunctive
relief is available against a state official under Ex Parte Young, but for
which monetary relief is unavailable as a constitutional matter. Statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, 39 such as the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 4 0 are also implicated to a
lesser extent. 4 1 It is worth noting that Congress's use of the Spending
Clause is neither infrequent nor insignificant in scope and subject
matter: If Congress were to reenact pursuant to its Spending Clause
38. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980) (finding that the inclusion broadened the
scope of § 1983, rather than reading the new language in pari materiawith the
codification procedures and the unchanged language in § 1983's jurisdictional
provision); see also Clive B. Jacques & Jack M. Beermann, Section 1983's "And
Laws" Clause Run Amok: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees in Cellular FacilitiesSiting Disputes, 81 B.U. L. REV. 735, 744 (2001) (discussing the "and laws" provision). But see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981) (excluding federal statutory schemes that are "sufficiently comprehensive .. . [that they] demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983" and requiring an "inquiry" into whether a
federal statute was the kind that created enforceable 'rights' under § 1983 (citing
Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984))). Important to this analysis, however, is that § 1983 claims, despite contrary language in its corresponding jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which was particularly useful before the
abolition of the amount in controversy requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction, may be maintained for many constitutional violations, not just those that
deprive a citizen of equal protection or that are predicated on the Bill of Rights.
See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448-50 (1991) (permitting a Dormant Commerce Clause claim). But see Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (declining to permit a Contracts Clause claim through the § 1983 vehicle).
39. Not all laws passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, or any congressional power
for that matter, necessarily create private rights enforceable through § 1983, see
supra note 38 and accompanying text, but many do. See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoke
Redev. Hous. AutlK, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987) (Brooke Amendment, Pub. L. 91152, § 213, 83 Stat. 389 (1969), to the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896,
50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)).
40. Pub. L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc).
41. Spending Clause provisions are affected to a lesser extent because sovereign immunity is considered waived by the state rather than abrogatedby Congress when
a state accepts federal money with strings attached. A heightened sensitivity to
state sovereignty, however, is present even when a state ostensibly waives its
immunity. This alters the default rules of statutory interpretation for any law
that could infringe a state's sovereignty. See Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118,
127-28 (4th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the statutory clarity required of Congress to
provide for fee shifting will be heightened if fee awards impact a state's sovereign
immunity.
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power those portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act42 ("ADA")
or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act43 ("ADEA") that apply
to the states (as a response to Kimel v. Florida44and Alabama v. Garrett 45 ), ADA and ADEA plaintiffs would also face some of the problem
this Article identifies. Section 1983 actions that raise constitutional
claims are not immune either. Rights such as those contained in the
Dormant Commerce Clause-the violation of which is actionable
through § 1983 4 6-are pre-Eleventh Amendment claims for which an
injunction does not run afoul of a state's sovereign immunity, but for
which damages are barred by Seminole Tribe.
B.

42 U.S.C. § 1988

After Alyeksa PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society, 47 in which
the Supreme Court held that it is for Congress to abrogate the default
American rule that each party bears its own litigation costs, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988.48 The Senate report accompanying the
Act states: "The purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous
gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in [Alyeksa] . . . [by] allow[ing] courts to provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel's fees to prevailing parties in suits to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed
since 1866."4 9 It went on to add:
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies
which these laws contain. In many cases arising under our civil rights laws,
the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which
to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights,
and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed
with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it
costs them to vindicate these rights in court. 5 0

The Court found these expressions of a congressional intent to provide attorneys' fees sufficiently clear to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the pre-Seminole Tribe era. 5 1 That holding is not terribly
surprising; the sentiments of Congress were expressed by the Court
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified in 42 U.S.C.).
Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)).
528 U.S. 62, 73-76 (2000).
531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001).
See supra notes 26 and 38 and accompanying text.
421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975); see S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N 5908, 5909.
Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, at *2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5908, 5910.
Id.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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itself, and the statute seemed to comply with the requirement that
Congress act to resolve what had been a narrow question of separation
of powers and judicial restraint in Alyeksa.52
However, what does qualify as a surprise is that the Court has
credited a fairly conclusory assertion by a House Report about the effect of the Eleventh Amendment. The House wrote: "Of course, the
11th Amendment is not a bar to the awarding of counsel fees against
state governments." 53 But, the precise holding of the case in which
the Court credited the House's bald assertion was limited to awards of
attorneys' fees for Fourteenth Amendment claims, which avoids any
inconsistency with Seminole Tribe.5 4 Yet the Court did recognize,
that it was Congress's express intent that fees be awarded from the
55
state treasury, teeing up the Edelman problem.
These tantalizing tidbits of legislative history and Supreme Court
dicta are the first acknowledgments that I can find of the problem for
§ 1983 identified in this Article. 5 6 Unfortunately, they are apparently
the most elaborate treatment of it as well. Commentators after the
enactment of § 1988 have simply stated: "[An award of fees payable
57
out of the state treasury is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment."
In the interest of comprehensiveness, note that fee-shifting statutes exist in other areas of the law, for example, under the Clean Air
Act,5 8 the Ocean Dumping Act,59 and the Endangered Species Act.60
52. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973) (describing a grant of civil rights
jurisdiction without a grant of attorney's fees as "but a gesture"); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (describing fees as a crucial
tool).
53. H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976).
54. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976)).
55. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694-95; S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5-6, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N 5908, 5913 ("In such cases it is intended that the attorney's fees, like
other items of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official
capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local
government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party)." (citations omitted)).
56. These are the first post-§ 1988 acknowledgements that I can find. Nagata's article, supra note 1, and the circuits after Edelman but before Hutto, dealt with this
problem when there was no congressional effort to abrogate the states' immunity,
which § 1988 purport to do.
57. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 204 (2d
ed., 2008); see E. RICHARD LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
25 (1981) ("As established in [§ 1988's] legislative history, as held by the Supreme
Court in Hutto v. Finney, and as followed by a unanimity of courts of appeals'
decisions, fees may be awarded against defendant states, and against their officers in their official capacities. . . without any bar being interposed by the Eleventh Amendment." (citation omitted)).
58. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1686 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7604(d)
(2006)).
59. Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1057 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2006)).
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Fee-shifting regimes crop up most often when Congress employs the
"private attorneys general" model of regulation.61 These other statutes are of little conceptual moment because the arguments about the
effect of Seminole Tribe on fee-shifting in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 apply, as a
conceptual matter, with equal or greater6 2 force to them as well. I
highlight these statutes here only as evidence of the extent of the
practical problem-fee-shifting pervades most areas of serious federal
63
regulation.
C.

The States' "Eleventh Amendment" Sovereign
Immunity6 4

The truest, and least useful, observation about state sovereign immunity is that it seems the Framers originally intended for the Constitution to displace no more of the states' sovereignty than was
required for the operation of the federal system. 6 5 Accepting the his60. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 897 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2006)).
61. Cf. Alyeksa Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 272 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that when a plaintiff acts as a private attorney
general, the rationale for an award of attorneys' fees is strongest). For a comprehensive list of fee-shifting statutes, see ALBA CONTES, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS ch.
28 (3d ed. 2004) and 3 MARY FRANcis DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT
AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES chs. 29-45 (2008).
62. I say with greater force because, as discussed in section V.B, there is at least an
argument that because § 1983 was enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 power, causes of action brought through it acquire a whiff
of the Fourteenth Amendment's abrogation power. I ultimately dismiss that
transmutation argument as unpersuasive for § 1983 causes of action, so it cannot
be made, or at least not plausibly so, with respect to acts that deal with the environment and the like. But cf Mariana T. Acevedo, The Intersection of Human
Rights and Environmental Protection in the European Court of Human Rights, 8
N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 437, 438-39 (2000) (seeing an equivalency between the right
to live in a healthy environment and civil, political, and human rights in the European Union); Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws To
Challenge Environmental Racism, 2 J. L. Soc'Y 5, 5-8 (2001) (tying environmental rights to civil rights).
63. For other examples from the civil rights context, even though suits against a
state for damages may not be cognizable, see the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,
42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (2006); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (2006);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006); and id. § 2000a-3(b).
64. The issue of a state's sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, which flows
from the state's constitution, is irrelevant to this Article. Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 709, 713 (1999), ensures that the same Eleventh Amendment concerns apply
in state court mutatis mutandis so long as the plaintiff brings a federal cause of
action.
65. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent... [although there are] circumstances which are necessary to produce an
alienation of state sovereignty .... ."), with Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 479 (1793) (permitting an action in assumpsit to lie against Georgia), over-
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torical gloss on the Eleventh Amendment-that as a default rule it
bars all actions against a state qua state-when are such actions permissible? 6 6 The most important, and the most durable, exception to
the Eleventh Amendment is undoubtedly Ex Parte Young. 6 7 There,
the Court permitted suits for injunctive relief to proceed against state
officers, without running afoul of the states' immunity from suit, 68 by
premising that relief on a fiction of personal liability for ultra vires
acts. 6 9 Such suits are now usually brought through § 1983.70,
The far less durable-and arguably less important 7 -exception
that has developed involves suits for damages. For some period of the

66.

67.
68.
69.

70.

71.

ruled by Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1890) (finding that the Eleventh
Amendment restored a sovereignty to the states that bars even suits not explicitly prohibited by its text). Yet, not all suits are barred. When the United States
is a party to an action, or an action is brought by a sister state, such cases do not
run afoul of any immunity. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Further, a state may be
forced to be a defendant in order for the Supreme Court to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 347 (1821). Even if
Hans stands as a dispiriting ddnouement to any suggestion that states may be
suable, it has a useful notion: Some surrender of sovereignty by the states was
"necessary" during ratification if federal laws and the Constitution are to be
vindicated. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3 ("[Justice Marshall] showed that this power
was absolutely necessary in order to enable the judiciary of the United States to
take cognizance of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States."). For an excellent overview of the history of sovereign immunity tailored
to the context of fee-shifting statutes, see Nagata, supra note 1, at 1172-94.
But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(critiquing Hans); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanationof the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1297 (1989) (elaborating
a theory of the Eleventh Amendment predicated on an intent to prevent only
those suits against states for which jurisdiction existed solely based on the citizenship of the parties).
209 U.S. 123, 166-67 (1908).
See id.
See id. The obvious fiction is that the person of the defendant is irrelevant to the
proceeding. When an official leaves office, her successor immediately assumes
her place in the suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1); FED. R. APP.P. 43(c); Sup. CT.
R. 40.3. Further, injunctive relief is only meaningful because of the defendant's
official position. See Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Gov. of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. 110, 123 (1828) (noting that claims
against officers in an official capacity are claims against the state). Contra Osborn v. The Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 857-58 (1824) (holding that only the parties
named in the record are relevant to jurisdictional and sovereign immunity concerns, although this is no longer good law).
See SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 57, at 113-15.
As between the ability to obtain damages and the ability to force compliance with
federal law, the latter seems paramount. If states were subject to limitless monetary liability, but not to injunctive relief, then they would be forced to conform
their behavior to federal law over time as a practical matter. The rationale for
the bar on most awards of damages-damages that impermissibly interfere with
the ability of a state to regulate its own affairs-provides one reason for nevertheless privileging injunctive relief over monetary relief: an injunction is a less
intrusive means of enforcing the supremacy of federal law (or so the conventional
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Court's history, the power of the federal government to abrogate a
state's immunity from damages awards was seen as a function of the
clarity with which Congress spoke in its attempt to regulate the states
72
as states.
The modern Court has retrenched by tilting towards the default
rule, and the potentially broad implications of these two exceptions
have not been realized. Injunctive relief is impermissible if alleged on
the basis of state law or a state constitution. 73 Sovereign immunity of
the federal kind is now available as a defense against suits brought in
state court, but based on federal law, even though the Eleventh
Amendment only refers to "[tihe Judicial power of the United
wisdom goes). There is, however, a better argument, and it comes from history.
Limitless monetary liability may, over time, force compliance with federal law,
but for plaintiffs denied federally protected civil rights in the short term, the
southern states' massive resistance to desegregation is a cautionary tale. See,
e.g., PAuL M. GASTON ET AL., THE MODERATES' DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA

73 (1998) (noting the high costs of resis-

tance). The Supreme Court could easily enough fashion and enter injunctions in
the face of recalcitrant state and federal courts in the South. It is doubtful that
the Court could have achieved the same result with the same speed (if you say
desegregation proceeded with any speed) had it been limited to damages. Damages are typically committed to the discretion of the jury (which, made up of locals, might suffer from local biases). I note the distinction between the relative
importance of these different types of abrogation because, as I develop in section
V.B, the need to incentivize suits for injunctive relief may overcome the countervailing principles that prohibit monetary relief.
72. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-31 (1989) (requiring textual abrogation); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1989) (finding abrogation when Congress used its Commerce Clause powers with ambiguous
language), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1996);
Hoffman v. Connecticut, 492 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1989) (finding "governmental
units" language insufficiently clear); Atascadero State Mental Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (requiring "unmistakably clear" language); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1979) (retreating from the use of legislative history); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (using legislative history to determine if Congress intended to abrogate immunity); Employees v. Dep't of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1973) (rejecting implied waivers for
traditional governmental activities pre-Welch); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 196-98 (1964) (using a theory of implied waiver), overruled by Welch v.
Texas, 483 U.S. 468, 476-77 (1987) (rejecting implied waivers).
73. See Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984). In some sense, this
decision may have had the effect of constricting a state's immunity. It was in
Pennhurst that the Court first made the fiction of Young explicit by saying that
however fictional the theory might be, it is necessary to ensure the supremacy of
federal law. That principle is present in the majority, but is best expressed in
Justice Steven's dissent where he writes, "[H]ow else can the principles of individual liberty and right [qualified by the majority to be federal liberty and rights]
be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual offenders, who are the instruments of the wrong, whenever
they interpose the shield of the State?" Id. at 164 n.48 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Poindexter v. Grennhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291 (1884)).
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States."74 As a default rule, any award, or at least any award of damages, that must be paid from the state treasury ("retroactive relief') is
prohibited under Edelman v. Jordan.75 Today, Dellmuth v. Muth76
and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,7 7 when read together, seem to foreclose
any effort by Congress to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, except through the use of (1) extraordinarily clear language that evinces
a congressional intent to permit retroactive relief from an officer of the
state (2) in a statute that was enacted pursuant to the Section 5 power
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The classic example of the type of case left standing after Seminole
Tribe is Fitzpatrickv.Bitzer.78 There, the Court upheld the provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that provided for damages
to persons discriminated against by a state on the basis of race, color,
74. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
75. 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The Court felt that this proscription of retroactive relief
was required by the effect of damages awards on a state's treasury, and the interference that such awards would work on the ability of the state to budget for its
affairs. See id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.
459, 464 (1945) (prohibiting damage awards against states).
76. 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989).
77. 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996). The post-Eleventh Amendment constitutional provisions,
such as the Reconstruction-era amendments, came later, so the Court has been
more willing to entertain suits for damages against states under these provisions
because they can be understood to abrogate the sovereign immunity that the
Eleventh Amendment implicitly reaffirmed as inhering in the Constitution. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996); Jennifer Cotner, How the
Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DuKE L.J. 713, 716 n.16 (2001).
78. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Other cases make this point clear. See Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 530-33 (2004) (permitting awards for certain violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act that were enacted under the Section 5 power of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 726-28 (2003) (permitting awards under the Family and Medical Leave Act
that are congruent and proportional to redressing sex discrimination). It seems
likely that the § 1988 decisions which permitted fees in suits asserting violations
of civil rights remain good law. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 278 (1989)
(desegregation); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-31 (1980) (AFDC with an
equal protection claim); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 (1978) (Eighth
Amendment). But another celebrated case in this area might not survive. In
Quern v. Jordan,440 U.S. 332 (1979), the district court granted relief only on the
claim that the state violated federal laws through its administration of the Aid to
the Aged, Blind, and Disabled program. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
653 (1974) (explaining the claims upon which the class, later before the Court in
Quern, had been granted relief). The Court has, however, now held that Congress lacks the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to redress discrimination against the disabled and the aged through the Americans with Disabilities
Act, see Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-74 (2001), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see Kimel v. Florida, 528 U.S. 62, 72-74 (2000). Unless the Court is unusually solicitous of the blind, it seems that Quern presents a
case in which attorneys' fees were awarded for a violation of a statute enacted
under a pre-Eleventh Amendment congressional power.
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religion, sex, or national origin. 79 The classic example of the type of
case felled by Seminole Tribe is Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.8 0 There,
the Court upheld an award against the state under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, which provided for monetary damages against an "owner and
operator" of a site which later requires cleanup.8 1 The Court explicitly
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe as an unconstitutional attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity through the use of a preEleventh Amendment congressional power, i.e., the Commerce
Clause.8 2 The topic of this Article is whether a8 3similar seismic shift is
waiting in the wings for fee-shifting statutes.
A quick look upwards at the Tenth Amendment in this short history of sovereign immunity is also in order. It should be noted that the
members of the Court who have sought to effectively bar damage
awards against states are the same as, or aligned with, those who lost
the battle against congressional power to regulate the states qua
states under the Tenth Amendment.8 4 It could be that awarding
states sovereign immunity from suit is a back-door effort to undermine congressional authority to regulate states (other than through
the Fourteenth Amendment), because a law that is unenforceable
through damages is a much less effective law.85 The peculiar irony of
such a strategy is that regulation of states in their traditional governmental capacities, indeed in their most traditional capacities, such as
79. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
80. 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-36 (1999) (refusing to permit abrogation
under Congress's patent powers).
81. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989).
82. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48.
83. But see Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 53 F. Supp. 2d 174, 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(upholding such an award, but without a Seminole Tribe analysis).
84. Compare Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (striking down
regulation of the state in its traditional governmental activities with Justices
Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and White dissenting), and Garcia v. Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (eviscerating any substantive restriction on congressional power through the Tenth Amendment with Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissenting), with Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 48 (expanding state sovereign immunity with Justices Ginsberg, Stevens,
Breyer, and Souter dissenting), and Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356
(restricting sovereign immunity with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and Kennedy dissenting).
85. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., FEDERAL CouRTs: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1109
(1996) (noting the similarities between these two cases); George D. Brown, State
Sovereign Immunity Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment
Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEo L.J. 363 (1985). Of course, states can still be compelled to conform to federal law through an injunction, but stripping damages
from the arsenal of the federal courts ensures that states enjoy one free bite at
the apple of non-compliance.
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an employer of fire, police, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation personnel, is permissible under such an approach-at least
insofar as the regulation is congruent and proportional to a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then again, on the traditional reading
of § 1983's purpose-the interposition of the federal government between the states and the people when states violate the Fourteenth
Amendment-that answer may get the sovereign immunity balance
exactly right. Some rights, such as those contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment, are perhaps more fundamental than the concept of state
sovereign immunity.8 6
III.
A.

THE FULL CONTOURS OF THE PROBLEM

The Practical Context

The "American Rule" for attorneys' fees-that each party bears its
own costs-was first announced in Arcambel v. Wiseman,8 7 and then
expressly applied by Alyeksa Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society8 8 to even those actions in which "Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy."8 9 The rule
works well for many litigation configurations. In fact, this Article will
assume that it generally strikes a good balance as a gatekeeper to the
courts. 90 The rule manages not to incentivize attorneys or plaintiffs to
vexatiously multiply suits, because the costs of prosecution will be
born by each party. A rational plaintiff, even with the means to pay,
will not spend money to prosecute a meritless suit, and a rational attorney will not agree to a contingency fee, which protects the plaintiff
from out-of-pocket expenditures, if a suit is meritless.91 Further, the
American Rule "avoid[s] stifling legitimate litigation by the threat of
the specter of burdensome expenses being imposed on an unsuccessful
party,"9 2 a disincentive that exists under the English Rule of "loser
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

But see infra section V.A (finding this conclusion somewhat problematic).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796).
421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).
Id.
For criticism of this view, see generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651 (1982), and
Michael Kao, Calculating Lawyers' Fees: Theory and Reality, 51 UCLA L. REV.
825 (2004).
91. See Winand Emons, Playing It Safe with Low ConditionalFees Versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees, 8 Am.L. & ECON. REV. 20, 22-23 (2006). There
are, of course, exceptions. When there is an asymmetry in financial resources, a
meritless suit can be brought (although it should not be brought under accepted
professional standards) to harass a defendant without deep pockets.
92.

20 Am.JuR. 2D Costs § 55 (2008).
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pays." 9 3

This incentive-disincentive balance usually works well, par94
ticularly when combined with the contingency-fee device.
The American Rule does not work well for cases in which there is
no possibility for damages or any potential recovery is tiny or speculative even if the claim succeeds. 95 Congress therefore responded to
Alyeska by enacting a fee-shifting regime for § 1983 and other litigation arising from the "civil rights acts which Congress has passed
since 1866"96 in recognition of the unique nature of the violations for
which relief is most frequently sought through § 1983. Successful
§ 1983 suits often produce little or no pot from which attorneys' fees
can be drawn, either because the suit was for declaratory or injunctive
relief, as it must be when brought against the state or its officials in
their official capacity, or because it is difficult to value violations of
97
federal law and the Constitution that are not classically tortious.
98
Unspoken, but certainly true, is the fact that impecunious litigants,
who are the most burdened by the American Rule, are also the § 1983
93. See Kao, supra note 90, at 826 n.2 ("In the English legal system, a successful
litigant is entitled to recover his or her legal fees from the losing party.").
94. The "loser pays" rule is not quite as draconian as it sounds because England did
not permit contingency fee arrangements until very recently. See Emons, supra
note 91, at 21 n.1. A default rule that shifts the fee acts in many ways like a
contingent fee, although it is not as effective at incentivizing suit. See Kao, supra
note 90, at 826-827 n.7.
95. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 297-300 (1990).
96. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at *1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5908, 5909; see
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
97. Section 1988 has been converted by judicial interpretation into a one-way feeshifting statute. Plaintiffs are well insulated from any potential liability for state
officials' attorneys' fees. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
421-22 (1978) (noting that although plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to attorneys'
fees for suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, defendants must
show that the complaint was frivolous); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14
(1980) (extending this reasoning to § 1983 actions). This is a theme of litigation
"[w]hen one side in a particular type of litigation regularly has the advantage of
superior resources." Rowe, supra note 90, at 663. A negative consequence of oneway fee shifting is the loss of the market disincentive, other than opportunity
costs and the risk of a frivolousness finding, to bring claims without merit. See
id. at 665-66.
98. Interestingly, § 1988 is an expression of strongly felt congressional policy, but
access to the courts independent of financial means, such as through contingencyfee arrangements, may also rise to the low-level type of prudential due process
concerns considered in, for example, a forum non conveniens analysis. Cf. Murray v. BBC, 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1996) ("There is a division of authority on
whether financial hardships facing a plaintiff in an alternative forum as a result
of the absence of contingent fee arrangements may cause a forum to be deemed
unavailable."); In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("While the fact should not be given 'substantial weight' the absence of contingent fee arrangements in a foreign jurisdiction is a permissible factor to weigh
in the forum non conveniens analysis." (citation omitted)). There is no reason
why such concerns should not also apply to fee-shifting regimes if contingent-fee
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litigants who most often find themselves acting as "private attorneys
general."9 9 It is the rare state that attempts to systematically deprive
its middle and upper classes of civil rights on a routine basis. And
groups targeted for discrimination rarely find themselves underrepresented amongst the poor.
Commentators are also in agreement that the American Rule does
not work well for § 1983 suits.' 0 0 That literature adds one important
consideration to the general theory of market incentives. Congress
and the Court have primarily focused on the role that fee-shifting
plays in the initiation of suit. Thomas Rowe and others have highlighted the role that fee-shifting plays in the maintenance of an action
as well.101 The clever state, staring down a potentially adverse judgment in the form of an injunction that could force it to change a
broadly applicable policy at great expense, would offer the particular
plaintiff an easy out by agreeing to cease the alleged violation of federal law, possibly only in the plaintiffs case.' 0 2 The state makes a
housing voucher available to this plaintiff, or rehires that blind employee. A plaintiff, and a plaintiffs attorney who thinks that she has
no reasonable possibility to recover much in the way of fees, would
likely settle such a claim out of understandable self-interest. But
other similarly situated individuals exposed to the same unlawful
state action would not, of necessity, benefit from such a settlement.
The injunction that the plaintiff originally sought would have benefited others similarly situated, and the possibility of obtaining fees incentivizes the plaintiffs attorney to keep the case going-a settlement
not only turns the billing clock off, but the Supreme Court has held
arrangements are unavailable as a practical matter, because, for example, it is
difficult to split one-third of an injunction.
99. See Brand, supra note 95, at 297-300; see also Attorney's Fees, supra note 30 at

1875 (collecting cases in which § 1983 actions were brought by persons dependent
on the state for support, such as welfare recipients, prisoners, and applicants for
state employment). But see Jacques & Beermann, supra note 38, at 735 (noting
that not just the impecunious benefit from such an arrangement, and describing
the consequences of market incentives to litigate).
As I discuss in more detail in Part V, there are other rationales for fee awards.
Professor Rowe has identified at least six: (1) fairness ("[I]t is only just for the
loser to have to pay.... ."), (2) "making a litigant financially whole," (3) deterrence
and punishment, (4) the "private attorneys general" model of regulatory enforcement, (5) accounting for the relative advantage that each party holds, and (6)
provision of a market incentive for all suits. See Rowe, supra note 90, at 653. Of
course, these all overlap to some extent.
100. For example, one oft-consulted treatise says that "[slection 1988 fees are an integral part of § 1983 remedies." SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 57, at 196.
101. See Rowe, supra note 90, at 665.
102. The class-action device and the reality that in many cases it is not possible to
favorably resolve one plaintiffs claim without making a change to the general
policy, act as natural limits on this type of behavior. There are, however, no
doubt plenty of cases in which this concern obtains.

2009]

FEE SHIFTING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

19

that settlement offers in civil rights cases that require a plaintiff to
forego fees are not necessarily unethical, despite the impossible posi10 3
tion in which they put the plaintiffs attorney.
As a practical matter, the American Rule for § 1983 actions asserting pre-Eleventh Amendment claims has the potential to seriously
disrupt a substantial portion of the modern litigation and regulatory
landscape-both by reducing the market incentive to bring suit and by
reducing plaintiffs' incentive to act as "private attorneys general" in
the conduct and maintenance of the suit.
B.

The Doctrinal Background

As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment has long been understood to bar suits by private actors against states for damages, regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff.1 o4 When a plaintiff can
avoid a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, for example, through
the Ex Parte Young fiction, it is currently believed that attorneys' fees
are available under the § 1988 fee-shifting regime if the plaintiff
"prevails." 10 5 The statutory scheme envisions that the fee award will
be paid from the deep pockets of the state treasury. 0 6 For the § 1988
scheme to survive recent changes in sovereign immunity jurisprudence, however, an award of fees must be both constitutionally and
statutorily proper. The Court has structured this inquiry as a twostep test.1 0 7 First, the language of the statute must be sufficiently
clear to provide for damages.' 05 Second, such an award must be
proper under cases like Edelman and Seminole Tribe.
Section 1988 seems to easily meet the first requirement. The
Court has said, "When it passed .. .[§ 1988], Congress undoubtedly
intended ... to authorize fee awards."109 Further, the Court appears
103. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 732 (1986) ("In fact, we believe that a general
proscription against a negotiated waiver of attorney's fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication of civil rights, at least in
some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement.").
104. See supra section II.C.
105. The manifold ways of understanding "prevailing" in this context are not addressed. See generally 15 Am.JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 193 (2007).
106. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989) (permitting recovery of
enhanced attorneys' fees); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 (1978) (permitting
recovery of attorneys' fees under § 1988); see also SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra
note 57, at 204 ("When prospective relief is awarded against state officials under
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, an award of fees [is] payable out of the state
treasury . . ").
107. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 61, T 7.04[2].
108. See, e.g., Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 129-32 (4th Cir. 2008).
109. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694; see Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74
(1927) (holding that a state's sovereign immunity does not bar the assessments of
costs); Missouri v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How,) 660, (1849) (awarding costs in a suit
between states). An interesting question is whether or not such an inquiry,
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not to require that § 1988 explicitly authorize such an award against
states, a requirement periodically found for the award of retrospective
relief.11o For purposes of this Article, I assume that § 1988 speaks
with sufficient clarity to permit awards of attorneys' fees against the
state as a statutory matter.
It is the second prong of the analysis that presents more difficulty.
The Court has been quite clear that "a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment," at least when the
claim does not arise under a post-Eleventh Amendment right."'1 Are
attorneys' fees, when paid from the state treasury, this type of prohibited liability?
To answer that question, it is helpful to understand where the
question fits within the framework of § 1983 jurisprudence. Suit
could be brought against an officer of a state or an inferior governmental unit, in her official112 or personal capacity, for damages or injunctive relief.
which turns on the intent of Congress, has survived. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223 (1989); see Wolpoffv. Cuomo, 792 F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (suggesting that Dellmuth overruled Hutto sub silentio). In Dellmuth, the Court explained that "evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and
textual . . . [and] [liegislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial
inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."
Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230. It could be argued that on an in parimateria reading,
the application of § 1988 to § 1983 and other civil rights actions that are designed, at least in theory, to be brought against states, gives sufficient textual
clarity to save § 1988. But such an argument runs squarely into the Court's decision that the language of § 1983 itself is insufficiently clear to bring it into operation against a state qua state. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979). Whatever the outcome the
Court might reach on the statutory interpretation question, this Article is concerned at bottom with whether Congress, as a constitutionalmatter, could fix any
problems with the statute, should they exist.
110. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694-95.
111. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax. Comm'n, 327
U.S. 573 (1946)); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996).
112. The consequences of official capacity suits, as opposed to personal capacity actions, developed over time. The Court has given a clear answer to the question of
a judgment's effect: a judgment against an officer in an official capacity suit "imposes liability on the entity he represents" so long as the entity received notice
and the opportunity to respond. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
That is, "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). This is probably loose language (even if of
no moment) however, because an action actually pleaded against the state itself
would likely be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 150 (1908). In a personal capacity suit, recovery is limited to the assets
of the officer. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). While this
distinction is usually considered in the context of the immunities avaliable to an
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To winnow those permutations down, note that personal capacity
suits for damages, regardless of any indemnity agreement that may
ultimately affect a state's treasury, are irrelevant to this discussion.
Although an officer may enjoy some form of immunity by virtue of her
office,11 3 this type of case differs little from the traditional tort
case, 114 because personal capacity suits are not effective against the
state, so the Eleventh Amendment does not apply.115 The case of a
personal capacity suit for injunctive relief is a little more difficult.
There, the classic tort configuration strains to encompass not just a
wrong done by a state actor against an individual, but the special powers that the actor possesses only by virtue of her office.l" 6 Where
there is a connection between the obvious fiction of individual capacity
suits for injunctive relief and sovereign immunity, such cases might be
problematic. That is, an action would be permissible under Ex Parte
Young, but fees might not be permissible under the twin inquiries of
Edelman and Seminole Tribe. However, this problem disappears because the Court has held that attorneys' fees are unavailable against
the state in any action against the person of the official because of the
causation problems that give rise to different standards of immunity
for governmental entities and individual officers.117 Suits against inferior governmental units and their employees, whether individual or
official capacity claims are brought, do not implicate the Eleventh
Amendment, so the Edelman/Seminole Tribe problem is again
moot.118

113.
114.

115.

116.
117.
118.

officer, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, it becomes important here because only
an official capacity suit for injunctive relief makes an award of attorneys' fees
problematic.
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (providing for qualified
immunity to state officials when their conduct is objectively reasonable).
Cf Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), overruled on othergrounds by Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (noting that the familiar standards of tort liability form the
background for this type of action, although they do assume a special federal
character).
See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 21, 25 (1991) (upholding an award of damages in a personal capacity suit against a state official for acts taken in an official
capacity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogatedon othergrounds by
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800. In fact, in Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67, the Court made
clear that for an award of attorneys' fees to be appropriate against the state, the
suit must have been against an officer in her official capacity. That is, while it is
provided for if theoretically possible to sue an official in her personal capacity for
injunctive relief, which indeed the strictest reading of Ex Parte Young suggests, a
prevailing plaintiff could then collect attorneys' fees from the individual officer
only.
See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67.
Retrospective damages are available in such cases because the Eleventh Amendment protects neither individuals nor inferior governmental units. See Monell,
436 U.S. at 690.
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The cases in which damages have been properly awarded under
§ 1983 against the state (or, more properly, a state official) are also
unproblematic because, a fortiori, an award of attorneys' fees under
§ 1983 is proper when the plaintiff could not have prevailed unless the
action was of such a type that it was constitutional to permit recovery
of damages. A constitutional and statutory basis1 9 for an award of
damages-plus the requisite clarity in the language of the attorneys'
fees statute needed to abrogate state sovereign immunity-means
120
that such an award is permissible.
The issue is properly framed in official capacity suits for injunctive
relief-like Finstuen. Such suits also happen to be the most common
§ 1983 configuration. In an official capacity suit seeking an injunction, the relief, under the Ex Parte Young fiction, does not run against
the state for purposes of sovereign immunity.12 1 Yet, an award of at119. This is, however, almost entirely a hypothetical case because the Court has held
that the most likely vehicle (with a companion fee-shifting statute) through
which such an award of damages would take place, § 1983, lacks sufficient textual clarity to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 338 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978). This is true
whether the action is brought in state or in federal court. See Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that states are not "persons" for
the purposes of § 1983, eliminating any claim that § 1983 is sufficiently clear to
abrogate sovereign immunity in state, rather than federal court).
120. As mentioned in Part I, this Article assumes this position by hypothesis. It need
not be true, however. Cf DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 61, 7.04[2] (stating the
inverse that "if the state cannot be held liable on the merits, it also cannot be held
liable for attorney fees"). If the rationale for awarding attorneys' fees is punitive,
one of the reasons identified by Professor Rowe for fee-shifting, it is possible to
conceive of a fee award as more injurious to a state's sovereignty than damages.
See Rowe, supra note 90, at 653, 660-61 ("Punishment for unjustified or undesirable behavior-sometimes in the transaction giving rise to litigation and sometimes in connection with the bringing or conduct of the litigation itself-finds
considerable acceptance as a reason to shift fees in certain situations."). The
Court decided in Ex Parte Young and Edelman that as between damages and
injunctive relief, injunctive relief encroaches on a state's sovereignty less. Although I have found no case on point, it is intuitively obvious that if nominal and
compensatory damages injure a state's sovereignty, punitive damages do so all
the more. Cf Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1992) (recognizing
that Congress has not waived the United States' sovereign immunity from common-law punitive damages). Note, however, that I am not speaking of fees
awarded for bad faith litigation conduct, which are adjutants to a court's power to
control litigant behavior, but of fee awards motivated by general punitive goals.
Even if attorneys' fees are not imposed for punitive reasons, the American
Rule makes them, as a default matter, an unexpected cost of defending a suit.
See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text. But, even though attorneys' fees
may not be contained within the general concept of damages, the Eleventh
Amendment's preeminent concern after Edelman-the effect of any part of a remedial measure on the state treasury-applies to fees and damages in like measure. Accordingly, I have treated fees as at least contained within the Eleventh
Amendment's conception of damages.
121. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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torneys' fees must come from the state because official capacity suits
are but another means of styling a suit against the state or its
arms. 12 2 If Edelman12 3 and Seminole Tribe12 4 are held to control fee
awards as well as damages, fee-shifting regimes would be permissible,
as a constitutionalmatter, only when based on post-Eleventh Amendment constitutional provisions and the federal laws enacted under
those provisions.
C.

The Near Misses in Precedent

No court seems to have decided the problem presented in this Article. In Maher v. Gagne, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that
would have made the issue moot.125 The Maher plaintiff sued Connecticut under §1983, asserting claims based on the Social Security
Act and various constitutional provisions. After the entry of a consent
decree, the plaintiff sought fees under § 1988. Connecticut argued
that the plaintiffs § 1983 action was in fact just a simple "and laws"
action based on the Social Security Act and that "Congress did not
intend to authorize the award of attorney's fees in every type of § 1983
action."12 6 The Court's response was clear: "[N]either the language of
§ 1988 nor its legislative history provides any basis for importing...
distinctions . . . among § 1983 actions ... into the award of attorney's
fees by a court .... "127 As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is
clear that plaintiffs who assert pre-Eleventh Amendment causes of action are eligible for attorneys' fees under § 1988.
Connecticut made a second, and for purposes of this Article more
relevant, argument as well. Granting the question of § 1988's statutory reach, it urged the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to attorneys'
fees in purely statutory, non-civil-rights cases. 128 The Court refused
to reach the issue, saying: "In this case, there is no need to reach the
question ....
[flor, contrary to petitioner's characterization, respondent did allege violations of her Fourteenth Amendment due process
122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
415 U.S. 651, 674-76 (1974).
517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996).
448 U.S. 122, 128 (1980). The precursors to Maherwere Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976), and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). They cover noncontroversial ground. In Fitzpatrick, the Court approved of fee shifting for claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat.
255 (codified in 42 U.S.C.), and its fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006). In
Hutto, the Court permitted attorneys' fees under § 1988 for an Eighth Amendment claim brought through § 1983. 437 U.S. at 690-91. Other cases touching
the issue include Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) (Fourteenth
Amendment claim), and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (Fourth
Amendment claim).
126. Maher, 448 U.S. at 128.
127. Id. at 129.
128. Id. at 130.
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and equal protection rights .. . [that were] sufficiently substantial to
support federal jurisdiction."129 Instead, the Court held that so long
as a "substantial" constitutional claim is pleaded as part of the § 1983
action, the ultimate claim on which the plaintiff prevails, even if it is a
non-civil-rights and non-constitutional claim, is irrelevant for Eleventh Amendment purposes.130 The Court reached this conclusion using an argument that I consider in section V.B, reasoning that even
though a non-civil-rights claim itself cannot lay claim to the Fourteenth Amendment's power to abrogate a state's immunity, incentives
to bring suits that include both a "substantial" constitutional claim
and non-constitutional/non-civil-rights claims are a congruent and
proportional exercise of Congress's Section 5 power to incentivize the
constitutional claim.131
No case resolves the present issue because the cases to date involve-subject to dicta in Maher discussed in section V.B-how to
handle claims that arise under the Fourteenth Amendment in one
fashion or another (e.g., under a statute like Title VII that is congruent and proportional to a Fourteenth Amendment harm) or under a
right enforceable against the states only by incorporation through the
Due Process Clause. The Court did, however, come close to addressing
the present issue in FairmontCreamery Co. v. Minnesota.13 2 There, it
held that the "United States never pay costs," but that when a state
becomes a party to litigation in the Supreme Court, it loses some character of its sovereignty.13 3 Fairmont held that the taxing of costs
against a state by the Court did not run afoul of any immunity because the state would not "be regarded as the sovereign here."13 4 The
Court made no mention of attorneys' fees, and, other than those conclusory remarks about a state's loss of sovereignty before the Supreme
Court, the bulk of the opinion was devoted to proving the historical
practice of the Court in assessing costs against states. 13 5 That historical data is useful in section V.D, but the radically nationalist flavor of
the Fairmontcourt's holding seems not to have survived cases staking
out a more expansive notion of state sovereignty. It is difficult to im129. Id. at 130-31. This is somewhat peculiar as it conflates the jurisdictional basis
for suit with the remedies available. It is not clear why the existence ofjurisdiction on the basis of Fourteenth Amendment claims should cover the availability
of a remedy for a non-Fourteenth Amendment claim after the Fourteenth Amendment claim has been dismissed.
130. Id. at 131-32.
131. Id. at 132.
132. 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927).
133. Id.
134. Id. This shades into the language used in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 347 (1821), to justify the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a state as a
party, but its applicability to the remedies available against a state as a party to a
suit commenced by a private party is unclear.
135. Id. at 76-77.
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agine the Seminole Tribe or Edelman courts saying: "We think that
the rule construed by long practice justifies us in treating the state
just as any other litigant."136
Courts after Seminole Tribe have not wrestled with the issue in
any serious way. 13 7 Before Hutto, some circuits considered the Eleventh Amendment issue and a split emerged, with some permitting attorneys' fees and others barring them under Edelman.138 After Hutto,
the only opinion to hint at the problem was Maher, but it predates
Seminole Tribe, and the Court had crutches like Union Gas13 9 available as authority had it been necessary to address whether attorneys'
fees implicate the Eleventh Amendment under Edelman.

136. Id. at 77.
137. See, e.g., Nat'l Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Face, 283 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir.
2002) ("Virginia contends first that sovereign immunity precludes an award of
attorneys fees against State officers when no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has been alleged. It argues that, in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, such as Seminole Tribe v. Florida,the authority of district courts to award
attorneys fees against State actors should be reexamined ....
[W]e reject Virginia's argument." (citation omitted)), vacated, 537 U.S. 802 (2002), reinstated,
322 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2003); Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1201 (8th Cir. 1996)
(due process and Eighth Amendment); cf Lawson v. Shelby County, 211 F.3d
331, 334-36 (6th Cir. 2000) (omitting a detailed analysis of Seminole Tribe). Districts in the Second and Fourth Circuits have held that states are not immune
from an award of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 789 (E.D. Va. 1998) (First Amendment). There were several cases before Seminole Tribe that directly confronted the issue and permitted
recovery of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341, 343
(5th Cir. 1996) (First Amendment). Some articles have addressed the matter as
well. See Cristian M. Stevens, Revolutionary or Aberrational?: The Status of the
Supreme Court's Recent FederalismCases in the Eighth Circuit, 44 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 529, 586 (2000) (referring to an Eighth Amendment claim); Ernest A. Young,
Book Reviews: Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the FederalBalance, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1551,
1598 (2003) (relying on an Eighth Amendment case); see generally Cotner, supra
note 77, at 713 n.15 (referring to a statute enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity,
and JudicialIndependence, 35 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, n.84 (2003) (referring to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. See Hallmark Clinic v. N.C. Dep't of Hum. Res., 519 F.2d 1315, 1317 (4th Cir.
1975); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704-05 (6th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Perini,
503 F.2d 899, 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds Taylor v. Perini,
421 U.S. 982 (1974); Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1974),
vacated on other grounds Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees, 421 U.S. 983 (1974); San
Antonio Con. Soc. v. Tex. Hwy. Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1974).
Nagata, supranote 1, at 1194-1206, 1215-19, provides examples of cases through
late 1975.
139. 491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989).
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EASY ANSWERS DISMISSED

Personal Capacity Suits

One trivial answer to the problem presented would squeeze all official capacity suits for injunctive relief into the personal capacity category. That would prevent fees from running against the state, which
would also disentangle the fee award from immunity concerns. 14 0 Although that answer does not resolve the conceptual question, it might
be a solution to any practical difficulties encountered by plaintiffs.
Yet, the Court has intimated that official capacity suits provide the
correct vehicle through which to request injunctive relief.14 1 At the
very least, for suits in which an official is sued as merely the agent of a
state entity-and the entity is given notice and an opportunity to respond-an ambiguous styling will probably result in treatment of the
suit as one against the individual in her official capacity. 142 Further,
choosing to bring suit in this way may present 3practical difficulties if
the official is judgment-proof or leaves office.14

140. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. Nagata, supra note 1, at
1202-06, discusses this possibility as well.
141. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978) ("Like the Attorney General, Congress recognized that suits brought against individual officers for injunctive relief
are for all practical purposes suits against the State itself. The legislative history
makes it clear that in such suits attorney's fee awards should generally be obtained either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his
agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or
not the agency or government is a named party)." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
142. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 n* (defining the characteristics of an official
capacity suit, but declining to resolve the circuit split on the method of determining in which form a suit is brought in the absence of clear pleadings).
143. It is certainly the plaintiffs prerogative to style a suit for injunctive relief against
a state officer in her personal capacity. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 468
(1985). Such a choice might prove unwise, however, if, for example, different immunities apply to the officer in her personal capacity that-although unavailable
to defeat a request for an injunction-would prevent the award of attorneys' fees.
Cf Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978) (discussing the qualified
immunities of state actors). Further, it is unclear if any injunction entered by the
court would survive the death or replacement of the officer, potentially requiring
the plaintiff to re-litigate the claim with each change in officeholder. Additionally, since personal capacity suits limit recovery to the assets of the officer, a
judgment-proof officer, not inconceivable given the potential size of attorneys'
fees, might undermine the purpose of § 1988 to incentivize suits seeking to enjoin
unlawful activity. Finally, it is unclear as a theoretical matter whether an injunction against a state officer in her personal capacity is always enforceable,
because many violations of.the injunction would necessarily be official acts, and
therefore subject to different liability standards.
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"Ancillary Awards"

Another easy answer is sometimes given. The Supreme Court has
called attorneys' fees merely "ancillary" to prospective relief; so, one
could argue that fees are not part of a truly retrospective award.144
This argument fails on two counts. 14 5 It is true that the distinction
between retrospective and prospective relief formed the basis for the
Court's decision in Edelman,14 6 but it is nothing other than conclusory
to use such a distinction in this context even assuming it is still the
proper distinction to use. 147 The Eleventh Amendment, and the
Court's understanding of the sovereign immunity that was restored by
144. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (noting that monetary
awards which are "ancillary" to an award of injunctive relief do not run afoul of
sovereign immunity); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) ("We
reaffirm our holding in Hutto v. Finney that the Eleventh Amendment has no
application to an award of attorney's fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State."); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (conceiving
of attorneys' fees as ancillary within the meaning ofEdelman); Maher v. Grange,
448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980) (affirming the circuit court's holding that attorneys' fees
are "ancillary" and therefore permissible). Although the Supreme Court ultimately decided these issues in favor of permitting fees as ancillary awards, it is
notable that the circuits, after Edelman but before Hutto, often found that an
assessment of fees against a state was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
cases cited supra note 138.
145. See Nagata, supra note 1, at 1199-1202 (discussing some of the problems with
this approach). The argument seems most persuasive in the context of awards of
attorneys' fees for bad-faith litigation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92
(1978); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282 (1989) (providing for an
enhancement of attorneys' fees to compensate plaintiffs for a delay in payment).
There, the assignment of fees works as a fine and is reasonably considered part of
the Court's equitable powers-like, for example, the imposition of damages for
violations of an injunction. See id. ("The principles of federalism that inform
Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce
their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail."). The power to award
fees for bad-faith litigation is truly "ancillary" to the Court's powers, equitable or
otherwise, as it is tied to the ability control the actions of the parties before it.
See Attorney's Fees, supra note 30, at 1891-92; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. Under § 1988, however, fees are assessed without regard to the good
faith of the defendant so there is no such analogy to the fines necessary for a
court to ensure compliance with its orders and procedure. Ironically, fees are
only assessed against a losing plaintiff (or when the state-defendant "prevails")
when the plaintiff has litigated in bad faith (frivolously), the reverse of the case in
which such a requirement should be imposed to finesse the Eleventh Amendment
problem. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980).
146. But see Nagata, supra note 1, at 1182-93 (predicating the Edelman distinction on
the difference between affirmative relief, which does not afford states flexibility
in conforming their conduct to the mandate of the federal court, and injunctive
relief, which simply prohibits one unconstitutional path of state action, but leaves
the state's discretion in moving forward intact).
147. 415 U.S. 651, 674-76 (1974). For elaboration of a theory of sovereign immunity
predicated not on the effect of monetary remedies but on being subject to suit, see
Federal Mar. Com'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765-66 (2002).
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it, takes no notice of a difference between retrospective and prospective remedies per se. This distinction was a convenient heuristic for
understanding the difference between damages and equitable relief,
which require different treatment because of important principles
that overcome the rationales for sovereign immunity (such as the
supremacy of federal law).148 The fact that an abstract distinction
may be drawn between retrospective and prospective relief-that is,
on a temporal scale attorneys' fees are not prospective relative to the
suit-does not answer the question whether there exists a meaningful
difference between the two. 1 49 For example, the Court would certainly not permit shoehorning an award of retrospective (read: damages) relief into a prospective (read: injunctive) remedy which
enjoined the state official to disburse funds to pay for past wrongs. 1 50
Further, to the extent that this distinction has independent weight,

148. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 674-76; see also Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
105 (1984) (noting that injunctive relief is crucial to vindicating the supremacy of
federal law). Indeed, as Justice Douglas pointed out, this heuristic may not even
be useful in distinguishing damage awards from injunctive relief. See Edelman,
415 U.S. at 682 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He points out that whether damages
are awarded for past harms or an injunction is issued compelling future payments, there is still a significant impact on the state treasury. See id.; see also
Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (2001) (highlighting the
irony between the treatment of damage awards for past harms and injunctions
issued compelling future payments). All that the distinction between retrospective and prospective relief might do in such a context is give a state a free bite at
the apple of violating federal law without consequence, though it may be compelled, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, to cease such a violation
through the expenditures of money later. Cf CLINTON, supra note 85, at 1084;
YACKLE, supra note 17, at 406-07 (noting that a state which violated federal law
in the past is in a superior position to that of one attempting to comply with the
law progressively). But see John C. Jeffries, Jr. The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 108-11 (1999) (seeing utility in this approach for
purposes of resource allocation).
149. Then-Justice Rehnquist's justification for this distinction-that retrospective relief might impose a sudden burden on the state treasury while prospective relief
would give the state a chance to adequately plan for the expenditure-is difficult
to accept. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665-66 n.11. What of prospective relief that
is granted after the year's budget has been set, but which requires expenditures
in that year for compliance? What of awards of retrospective relief that co-occur
with the budgeting process? Is the requirement that a state spend $6 million,
albeit prospectively, less intrusive on the state budgeting process than a requirement that the state pay $1 in nominal retrospective damages? Compare Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the millions
required to comply with the injunction approved by the majority), with Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (barring even nominal
damages).
150. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665-66 (rejecting a formulation of retrospective relief
through a monetary award as "equitable restitution" rather than damages).
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vis-a-vis the
attorneys' fees are not truly prospective or retrospective
15 1
suit because they arise at the same time as suit.
There is an even more fundamental difficulty with this argument.
It is hard to understand what "ancillary" means in this context. If it
means that the fees are but a small portion of the relief, that is not
always true-attorneys' fees can swamp any award of actual damages
for past violations (the quantum of which must be hypothetical because the suit is for injunctive relief).1 5 2 Also, the size of a demand on
the state treasury itself does not determine whether relief is retrospective or prospective in any event.153 Further, fees are not ancillary
in the sense that they are common or expected. Parties who have litigated in good faith are not ordinarily assessed fees under the American Rule. 15 4 Nor are attorneys' fees ancillary in the sense that they
must be spent in order for a state to comply with an injunction, even if
they should be spent to facilitate suits seeking to redress unlawful activity by states, i.e. they are not necessary auxiliaries.' 5 5 Finally, to
say that fees are ancillary in the sense that they supplement or are
subordinate to § 1983 actions is to beg the question. 15 6 Although fee
awards certainly provide incentives to seek injunctions against unlawful state behavior, it is unclear how such a pragmatic benefit grounded
in a rather minor (from a constitutional perspective) public policy concern can override the clear statement that the Eleventh Amendment
bars recovery by a private plaintiff from the state treasury. This Article returns to the issue in section V.B. For now, note that one could
imagine retrospective relief itself as subordinate to the more expensive and oppressive ongoing relief required by some injunctions. "Ancillary" is a problematic term.
If it is accepted that (1) fee awards run against the state, that is,
they are retrospective, retroactive, monetary awards, or damages (depending on the nomenclature) that draw from the state treasury (the
Edelman question), then (2) they are barred except when such a suit
151. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
152. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that fees can be significant in the sense of having an
effect on the treasury of a state).
153. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 69. This is so even though the rationale for a bar
against retrospective relief rests on the fear that it will disrupt the ability of a
state to manage its budgetary affairs. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666.
154. See Alyeksa Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
155. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER's DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining ancillary as "auxiliary, supplementary"). By way of comparison, certain injunctions do require sig-

nificant (and nominal) expenditures for their compliance, both of which have
been deemed acceptable as adjutants to equitable relief. See Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 346-48 (1979) (requiring a de minimus expenditure to notify class
members of procedures to recoup wrongfully withheld benefits).
156. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining ancillary as
"subordinate, subsidiary.")
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for damages is permissible, usually only under the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment (the Seminole Tribe holding).
V.

SOME EFFORT AT AN ANSWER

There are at least five ways of thinking about a solution to the conceptual problem in this Article. First, Fairmont could have gotten it
right. Perhaps, except with respect to damages, if the special character of a state's sovereignty is lost when a state adjudicates a constitutional claim in federal court because both are created, and enforced,
"under the authority of the United States," 157 then states should be
treated as any ordinary litigant. This result might be correct, but the
tenor of this reasoning is incompatible with the modern Court's statements. For example, the Court said in Alden: "The Constitution ...
does not foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising
under federal law merely because that law derives not from the State
itself but from the national power."158 In fact, the Alden opinion is
hostile to Fairmont not just as a matter of tone, but as a matter of
logic as well. Alden held that "States' immunity has been described in
sweeping terms, without reference to whether a suit was prosecuted in
state or federal court."159 Even Fairmont implicitly acknowledged
that a state enjoys sovereign immunity from costs (and so fee awards)
in its own courts. 16 0 The attitude of Fairmont towards states' sovereignty has long been replaced with a reverence that the modern Court
contends states enjoyed at the time of the framing. 16 1 I deal with the
better potential solutions to the conceptual problem in greater detail
below.
A.

Who Cares?

The best answer to the problem might be a yawning: "Who cares?"
It seems clear that the purpose of §§ 1983 and 1988 was to provide a
remedy for violations of "civil rights."16 2 Certainly any violation of
whatever rights are classically thought of as "civil" can be reached by
Congress through its Section 5 power, or a plaintiff can assert the
right under the Fourteenth Amendment directly. The amendments
157.
158.
159.
160.

Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999).
Id. at 745.
Fairmont,275 U.S. at 74 ("The sovereignty of the government not only protects it
against suits directly, but against judgments even for costs, when it fails in prosecutions. But is the state to be regarded as the sovereign here? This court is not a
court created by the State of Minnesota." (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
161. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 ("The generation that designed and adopted our federal
system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.").
162. See supra note 30-33 and accompanying text.
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directed at the discrete and insular minorities of whom the Court and
Congress should be most solicitious,163 along with the statutes enacted under those amendments, are protected under Seminole Tribe.
The rights flowing from the Reconstruction-era amendments that can
be directly asserted through § 1983, and any statutes enforcing those
amendments, are exactly the types of actions that Seminole Tribe took
pains to preserve. The market still incentivizes cases asserting these
claims: attorneys' fees are available from the state under § 1988 because damages are, as a constitutional matter, available. Damages
(and so fees) are barred only in suits asserting violations of statutes
enacted under non-civil-rights provisions, like those in Justice Powbut
ell's sardonic selection for his Thiboutot dissent. It is anything
6
clear that Congress ever intended to incentivize those suits.1 4
In its most summary form, this answer synthesizes the tension between the quotations at the beginning of this Article by equating "fundamental laws," for which Congress says it is necessary to have a
market incentive, with post-Eleventh Amendment rights. On this
reading, Justice Powell got it exactly right when he said in Thiboutot
that the majority had
transformed purely statutory claims into "civil rights" actions under § 1983
[when] that phrase.., was-and remains-nothing more than a short...
hand reference to equal rights legislation enacted by Congress. To read1'and
65
laws" more broadly is to ignore the lessons of history, logic, and policy.

Yet, three objections to such a casual dismissal of the problem give
a moment's pause. The first is obvious and has two parts, but it is not
fatal. Unlike in Thiboutot, in which the Court was interpreting what
statutory claims may be brought through § 1983, the fee-shifting issue
raises questions about what statutes and what constitutional provisions Congress will ever be able incentivize. The distinction is clear.
An expansive reading of Edelman and Seminole Tribe would (1) forever remove the question of what incentives are proper from democratic control, and (2) bar incentives to the enforcement of not just
statutes, but constitutional provisions like the Supremacy Clause. On
the first objection, if Thiboutot was a mistake, Congress can correct it.
Not so with an expansive reading of Seminole Tribe and Edelman.
But that, of course, can only counsel caution, not a contrary resultall cases with a constitutional basis share this feature of anti-democratic effect.
The second objection asks: Why should the Eleventh Amendment
be the dividing line between laws that are "fundamental" to the nation
163. See text and sources cited supra note 15.
164. See supra note 48-55 and accompanying text. If nothing else, even though Congress has not exercised its power to correct Thiboutot, § 1988 did predate the
broad reading of "and laws" that gives rise to many of the potentially disincentivized suits.
165. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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and those that are not? Undoubtedly the Reconstruction-era amendments were crucial to perfecting the Constitution and the Union. 16 6
But, does that detract from the fundamental character of pre-Eleventh
Amendment constitutional provisions? It is, after all, the pre-Eleventh Amendment Constitution that defines the very operation of the
national government. Embedded in that objection, however, also lies
the reason that a breezy response is not fatal. As a "fundamental"
matter, the Court has concluded that the Eleventh Amendment restored to the Constitution's original provisions a balance of state and
federal power that did not contemplate damages for actions by states
that violate pre-Eleventh Amendment constitutional provisions.16 7
An intellectually coherent position could consider the vision of federalism inherent in the pre-Eleventh Amendment Constitution, and
therefore "fundamental" to the nation, as one that does not contemplate (1) actions for damages against states or (2) a market incentive,
paid for by the funds of a state treasury, to bring suits for injunctive
relief. As explained in section III.B, the latter is not a strict consequence of the former, but the point here is not that the use of the Eleventh Amendment as a constitutional dividing line requires that fee
awards be barred, but rather that such a line is not as irrational as it
may seem at first glance.
Next, it might also give some pause that the concept of civil rights
when § 1983 was adopted, but before § 1988 was passed, included economic rights. 168 It is somewhat historically inaccurate to say that the
modern fair labor regulation disincentivized by a broad reading of
Seminole Tribe and Edelman is equivalent to the type of economic
rights that the framers of § 1983 had in mind-they likely thought of
the right to enter the marketplace, to contract freely, etc. 16 9 Yet at
166. See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association ("The Bicentennial Speech") (May
6, 1987), availableat http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/speeches/constitutionalspeech.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) ("While the Union survived the civil war,
the Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty,
and property of all persons against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.").
167. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of § 1983 litigation and economic rights, see generally Michael
G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied ConstitutionalActions, and the Scope of
Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493 (1989).
169. As Professor Collins points out, it would be seriously wrong to think of this type
of regulation as what the Court had in mind while § 1983 was mothballed during
the Lochner era. See Collins, supra note 168, at 1494. He contends that even
today, "[i]t is at least arguable that § 1983 was not intended to cover" what he
says "may loosely be called 'economic' rights under the commerce, contract, takings, supremacy, and interstate privileges and immunities clause .... Before the
modern revival of § 1983 ... many such 'economic' rights would have been actionable in federal court under section 1331 only." Id. at 1495.
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least some of the meatiest regulation for the people most likely to be
victims of state inattention-the poor, the disabled, and other politically disadvantaged minorities-might come within some conception
of economic "civil rights." This would make a reading of sovereign im170
munity that de-privileges such actions more worrisome.
The final objection to the "Who cares?" response digs a little deeper
into the first objection and reveals a more troubling conceptual concern; one that I think forecloses simple acquiescence to a new bifurcation of the Constitution. Actions through § 1983 to enforce the
supremacy of federal law, which use the cumbersome technique of vindicating the right in the statute that displaces the state law, would
lose their market incentive.1 7 1 The federal statutes that displace a
state cause of action will rarely be of the type enacted under the Section 5 power. 1 72 Further, even if it were possible to directly enforce
the Supremacy Clause through a § 1983 action, the Supremacy Clause
is a pre-Eleventh Amendment provision. Yet if any provision of the
Constitution deserves the greatest ability to disturb the balance of
power between the states and the federal government-if any provision deserves the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity-intuitively that provision would seem to be the Supremacy Clause. A
response might be given that, from the federal judiciary's perspective,
the guarantee of federal law as supreme cannot be such an important
right if it is not the type of right ordinarily enforced by courts. Even
170. Professor Collins offers a thoughtful rebuttal to this position. He says, "[T]he
attorney's fee incentive is less needed for most cases involving ordinary regulatory legislation. In that context, the economic incentives associated with enjoining enforcement of unconstitutional regulation itself often provides sufficient
impetus to bring suit. . . . [Fee shifting is not] desirable in terms of its added
burden on the public fisc as a consequence of good faith efforts at economic regulation." Collins, supra note 168, at 1561-62. For a business, for example one
facing a confiscatory state action or one subjected to discriminatory treatment in
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, this is undoubtedly true. I am focusing, however, on the incentive structure for actions that seek to enforce federal
statutory or constitutional guarantees on behalf of individuals outside of a class
action. Empirical scholarship on the matter is lacking. See Rowe, supra note 90,
at 656. When a state as an employer fails to comply with a more elaborate federal regulatory regime, Professor Rowe's notion that Congress uses fee shifting to
affect the relative strength of the parties when "[it] perceives a regular imbalance
... [between] adversaries" not only explains the pattern seen among which statutes provide for fee shifting, but also seems like a good empirical hunch. Id. at
663-64.
171. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1989) (holding that the guarantees of the Supremacy Clause, while not themselves enforceable through § 1983, were nevertheless enforceable as through the federal statute,
which guaranteed a right that preempted the state cause of action).
172. Quite to the contrary, state causes of action are now displacing federal causes of
action for the deprivation of rights at the hands of federal officers. See, e.g., Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1108 (10th Cir. 2005).
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§ 1983 has not been interpreted to provide an independent cause of
action for its enforcement.1 73 But it is the idea of the supremacy of
federal law that the Court freely admits drives the fiction of Ex Parte
Young.1 74 In fact, when the need to ensure that federal law remains
supreme is absent, e.g., when an injunction is brought on the basis of
state law, the Court has abolished the Young action.' 75 It is difficult
to shrug off, for all time, Congress's ability to provide market incentives for the vindication of the supremacy of federal law through
§ 1983 "and laws" actions when no suits against states would be permissible in the absence of supreme federal law.
B.

Reexamining "Ancillary Awards"

In addition to the discussion in section IV.B, there are four more
subtle meanings of "ancillary" that emerge from the case law. The
first one turns on whether the enactment of §§ 1983 and 1988 pursuant to the Section 5 power makes "and laws" claims, which do not
themselves arise out of a valid exercise of the Section 5 power, "ancillary" to the purposes of §§ 1983 and 1988 because most § 1983 litigation involves classical civil rights, which do arise out of a valid
exercise of the Section 5 power. 1 7 6 Put another way, perhaps "ancillary" means that a fee award for pre-Eleventh Amendment claims is a
kind of Section 5 "congruent and proportional" remedy for post-Eleventh Amendment harms to which the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed. 177 This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First,
the Court treats § 1983 as a procedural vehicle only, not as a grant of
substantive rights. A claim that a law violates a fair-labor-standards
statute enacted under the Commerce Clause power is not converted,
by virtue of having been brought through the § 1983 vehicle, into a
claim within the penumbra of civil rights-or brought "under" § 1983
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
See id.
Whether this is true as an empirical matter is unknown. Most research does not
distinguish between classic § 1983 actions and "and laws" actions. See, e.g.,
ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (Dec. 1994) (No. 92-BJ-

CX-K026). Looking at the categories that studies use, it appears that unless
there is a very non-uniform distribution of cases, most § 1983 cases involve classical civil rights claims.
177. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000). The Court has classified § 1988 as enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5 power, at least when used
to provide attorneys' fees in civil rights cases. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
698 n.31 (1978). For fees in non-civil rights cases, like "and laws" actions under
§ 1983, it is not clear what constitutional power Congress exercised when it enacted these statutes, but, presumably it used its interstate commerce power.
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itself. 178 Admittedly, this type of argument has been successful in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence generally-witness the continued availability of relief for violations of select provision of the Bill of
Rights, which are, of course, all pre-Eleventh Amendment rights. But
when the Court has channeled selected portions of the Bill of Rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process, the
Court has selectively determined which rights are actually within the
textual meaning of due process itself. It is fair to call pre-Eleventh
Amendment rights sifted in that manner true Fourteenth Amendment
rights-they acquire a post-Eleventh Amendment quality and do not
need to relate back to their original provisions for anything other than
the substantive criteria by which violations will be judged to ensure
congruence between restrictions on the state and federal governments. 1 79 The detailed constitutional review by the Court during in178. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989). The Court dropped a
fascinating footnote in Maher v. Gagne that addressed this issue. 448 U.S. 122
(1980). It said:
[Connecticut] seeks to distinguish this case from Hutto v. Finney on the
ground that Hutto involved an adjudication of a constitutional violation,
rather than a statutory violation. However, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent, the underlying claim in Hutto was predicated on the
Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than on any substantive provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. The prisoners' claim in Hutto was therefore arguably
more analogous to the statutory claim involved in this case then [sic] to
the constitutional claims asserted here or to the equal protection claim
asserted in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.
Id. at 133 n.16 (citations omitted). This footnote supports taking two extreme
positions: (1) Congress cannot provide for fee-shifting incentives to litigate even
the most classical violations of civil rights contained in the First through Tenth
Amendments, because the process of incorporation does not alter the pre-Eleventh Amendment character of the rights; or (2) the Court has settled, as a constitutional matter, the power of Congress to provide for attorneys' fees in litigation
that asserts pre-Eleventh Amendment rights, whether or not those pre-Eleventh
Amendment provisions acquire a Fourteenth Amendment character because they
are incorporated against the states. It is unlikely that either extreme represents
the true meaning of the Maher dicta. The Court seemed most interested in buttressing its argument that so long as substantial claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment are pleaded, the fact that relief is ultimately granted on a non-civilrights statutory claim does not bring the Eleventh Amendment into play. Cf.
supra note 129 and accompanying text; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (2004); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)
(link~ing substantiality of thc fcdral interest in the claim pleaded to the existence

of jurisdiction). That was the middle position in Maher, but other than as an
atmospheric, it bears no relation to the conceptual problem in this Article.
179. But see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 597 (1990) (announcing a different standard for the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(restoring congruence). One consequence of not reading laws enacted under preEleventh Amendment powers as converted into Fourteenth Amendment actions
because § 1983 was enacted pursuant to this power is that the congruence sought
by the Court in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is now vitiated. That
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corporation ensures that these are truly Fourteenth Amendment
rights, something very difficult to do with statutory rights that the
Court, by hypothesis for the fee-problem to have arisen, has already
determined to be incongruent or disproportionate responses to congressionally perceived, but constitutionally insufficient, instances of
Fourteenth Amendment harms.' 8 0 The Court is not even unanimous
on the transmutation argument for cause-of-action purposes, so I
think that resting the permissibility of attorneys' fees on this rationale asks it to bear too much.'18 If § 1983 is a procedural vehicle only,
why should it alter the character of the rights asserted through it?
Finally, it is farfetched to contend that encompassing bankruptcy,
patent, supremacy, and commerce issues would be congruent in any
meaningful sense to the ends of § 1983; the statute can function as an
adequate remedy for violations of civil rights without protecting those
other rights. That distinguishes "and laws" actions from those rights
entitled to incorporation-incorporated rights, in the Court's mind,
form the very essence of the due process that the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
A second sense of "ancillary" turns on whether attorneys' fees fall
outside of the categories of relief that the Eleventh Amendment bars
(the Edelman question)-not whether Congress has spoken clearly
enough and used a Post-Eleventh Amendment power.' 8 2 That is, like
an injunction or an in rem bankruptcy proceeding, it may be possible
that attorneys' fees do not impinge on the true concerns that motivated the Court to bar damage awards.18 3 This is not the same as
calling attorneys' fees "prospective"; rather, this reading of "ancillary"
simply states that fee awards are not "retroactive" relative to the policies that underlie that bar. If the concern about damages (prospective
or retrospective) expressed in Edelman turns on whether damages encroach a state's ability to set its own priorities through its budget,
then the question of whether attorneys' fees should be permissible re-

180.

181.
182.

183.

is, causes of action will lie against (either on a formal or practical basis) only the
federal government for some legislation that applies to the states as well. It is in
the nature of state sovereign immunity, however, and the limits on Congress's
ability to abrogate it, that some amount of incongruence will occur.
If the statute is a congruent and proportional remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no problem obtaining either damages or attorneys'
fees; the cause of action is a classical civil rights claim, not an "and laws" action.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1989); Maher, 448 U.S. at 131
n.14 (1980) (contending that Fairmont Creamery Co. v. State of Minnesota, 275
U.S. 70 (1927), stands for the proposition that attorneys' fees are outside the concerns of the Eleventh Amendment even when awarded pursuant to a statutory
scheme enacted after Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.
240 (1975)); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 (1978) ("Costs have traditionally
been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
See Maher, 448 U.S. at 123.

2009]

FEE SHIFTING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

37

ally reduces to an empirical one-one which the Court has answered
with a "no."18 4 Of course, such an approach also problemitizes the
Court's approach to nominal damages. Yet it seems like a far less
principled (or workable) distinction to permit nominal damages, while
barring meaningful damages, than to bar damages, but not the costs
associated with prosecuting a suit.18 5
Having left to one side the argument that fees are ancillary in the
sense that they inhere in a court's power to control the litigants before
it-a notion put to rest in circumstances other than bad-faith litigation by Alyeska-there is one remaining sense in which fees might be
meaningfully "ancillary". It relates back to the original purpose given
by the Court for permitting any type of suit against the state. As
much as injunctive relief is crucial to the vindication of the supremacy
of federal law, attorneys' fees are crucial to the practical ability to
bring suit. As such, they are ancillary in the sense of section IV.B
because they are a necessary auxiliary to the vindication of the
supremacy of federal law. Although this is not an elaborate argument
in favor of awarding fees, it may be the most fundamentally persuasive. Sections 1983 and 1988 may have been intended to vindicate
only "civil rights," but Ex Parte Young exists to vindicate all federal
rights. Consequently, incentives to ensure that such actions can be
brought serve the same purposes underlying the very case which
made any relief available at all.
This final approach deserves mention because it finds considerable
support in the Court's own characterizations of attorneys' fees. For
example, the Court said in Jenkins: "Unlike ordinary 'retroactive' relief such as damages or restitution, an award of costs does not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that first brought him into court.
Instead, the award reimburses him for a portion of the expenses he
6
incurred in seeking prospective relief."18 Before Jenkins, Hutto187
88
and Maherl
had approvingly quoted § 1988's legislative history. It
is important that the Court has credited this rationale and that it is
not just a feature of the congressional policies underpinning § 1988
and discussed in section II.B-a strong congressional policy is possibly
184. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.l! (1974). The Court seems to have
concluded that attorneys' fees do not have an appreciable effect on a state budget.
.See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 692 n.!8. Yet the Court h s seemed reluctant to credit the

185.
186.

187.
188.

effect of de minimis impacts on the state budget. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 347 n.19 (1979).
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
Missouri, 491 U.S. at 278 (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 695 n.24). This argument
does suffer from something of a bootstrapping flavor, however. Cf. Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 69-71 (1986) (holding an interest in fees insufficient to support standing).
Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694.
Maher, 448 U.S. at 129, 133.
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useful as a matter of statutory interpretation, but it is of limited value
on the constitutional question. The Court's acceptance of this incentive rationale provides an opportunity to fold the practical consequences of barring fee awards identified in section III.A into the
conceptual problem. Fees can be considered "ancillary" in the constitutional sense of necessarily auxiliaries to Ex Parte Young actions, because without them the procedural ability to vindicate the supremacy
of federal law would be a "hollow gesture." When the Court accepted
Congress's treatment of market incentives for suit as bound up in the
rights to be enforced, it opened the door to a role in the constitutional
calculus for pragmatic concerns about litigants' access to the courts.
The low-level due process concerns about financial access to the courts
found in forum non conveniens cases and discussed in section III.A
also enhance the constitutional relevance of market incentives for
suit. Unfortunately, as discussed in section IV.B, Edelman takes a
crabbed view of "ancillary award" as limited to costs associated with
enforcing a particular court order.18 9 It would be quite a stretch to
view a generalized concern about the proper functioning of the whole
civil-rights-litigation market as the type of "ancillary" relief that
Edelman really meant to preserve.
C.

Is Edelman the Problem?

Even though it is Seminole Tribe that creates the practical problem
identified in this Article by foreclosing, as a constitutional matter,
Congress's ability to provide damages for pre-Eleventh Amendment
violations of federal law, the real conceptual problem in the first instance may rest with Edelman's two rules for distinguishing between,
on the one hand, permissible types of relief, and, on the other hand,
remedies that will contravene the Eleventh Amendment unless Congress is empowered to abrogate the states' immunity (or there is a
waiver).
The first rule holds that "a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."1 90 That is the rule
which would seem to bar attorneys' fees because they are liabilities
paid out of the state treasury. The second rule, applicable only if relief
will cost money somehow, says that prospective relief is permissible,
but retrospective relief is not. 19 1 Edelman attempted to synthesize
these two rules by adding that "an ancillary effect on the state treasury is permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the princi189. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
190. Id. at 663.
191. Id. at 667-68. For further discussion, see Nagata, supra note 1, at 1182-1293.
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ple" that prospective injunctive relief is available under Ex Parte
Young.19 2

The fee-award cases that grappled with the two rules after
Edelman, but before Seminole Tribe cut off alternative paths to upholding congressional fee-shifting schemes, all share something notable. In Hutto, the Court said:
The cost of compliance is "ancillary" to the prospective order enforcing federal
law. The line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid
that it defeats the effective enforcement of prospective relief.
While the decisions allowing the award of costs against States antedate the
line drawn between retroactive and prospective relief in Edelman, such
awards do not seriously strain that distinction. Unlike ordinary "retroactive"
relief such as damages or restitution, an award of costs does not compensate
the plaintiff for the injury that first brought him into court. Instead, the
award reimburses1 him
for a portion of the expenses he incurred in seeking
93
prospective relief.

Jenkins struggled with the same (if non-serious) "strain" that the
"longstanding practice of awarding 'costs' against States" put on
Edelman.194 Moreover, Hutto explicitly approved of a compensatory
rationale in some cases because "that the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan
that operates prospectively."195 Yet, compensatory relief requires a
retrospective vantage point by definition-otherwise there is nothing
to compensate.
I believe that the post-Edelman fee cases have struggled with the
two rules because costs and fees reveal that the rules do not completely partition the universe of remedies. A past versus future temporal continuum plus the "ancillary" concept does not exhaust all
conceivable remedies, because not all non-prospective relief is retrospective, and not all non-retrospective relief is prospective. Some remedies look to the timing and conduct of the suit itself, making them
more appropriately thought of as contemporaneous with the suit.196
On the first step of the Edelman inquiry, attorneys' fees do come
from the state treasury. They are therefore permissible only if they do
not involve retrospective relief (or do involve prospective relief; the
daylight, if any, between those two phrasings is, in fact, the problem).
Fee awards do not flow from a defendant's compliance with the law in
192.
193.
194.
195.

Maher, 448 U.S. at 668.
437 U.S. 678, 695 n.24 (1978) (citations omitted).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989).
437 U.S. at 691 n.17 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977)).

196. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard and the Unravelingof the Prospective Retrospective Distinctionin Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 Geo L.J. 7 (1998). Other than attorneys' fees and costs, sanctions are
another good example of a remedy (in that case, for affronts to the court) that do
not look to the past or future conduct of the state, except as a litigant.
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the future; so they are non-prospective, at least relative to the future
compliance itself, if not the practical availability of obtaining it. But,
fee awards are also not retrospective relief in the sense that the recipient of a fee award is compensated for a past harm; she is at most made
whole for the costs of obtaining prospective relief. So, fee awards do
not appear barred under the second rule if non-retrospectivity trumps
non-prospectivity. Edelman's purported synthesis of the rules-the
"ancillary" language-offers little guidance, particularly under
Edelman's literal conception of "ancillary" as an expense for shaping
"official conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees." 19 7 Such an
expense will always be at least somewhat prospectively directed because the definition refers to shaping conduct. Attorneys' fees are not
prospective (relative to the relief itself), they are not retrospective (to
the time of injury at least), and they are not clearly ancillary as discussed in sections II.B and IV.B. But they do involve the public fisc.
Edelman's classification scheme is unworkable here.
Even if these factors could all be worked out in the individual case,
Professor Rowe points out,198 and other commentators confirm, 1 9 9
that fee awards have a chameleon-like quality; they further different
policies based on minor changes to the facts. 200 Yet courts have almost uniformly upheld the availability of fee awards against states,
even though the rationales may differ greatly (e.g., punishment for
bad-faith litigation versus a market incentive, etc.). 20 1 And so it
seems that fee awards are neither fish nor fowl under Edelman's
framework. This is probably why Jenkins, Maher, and Hutto all
reached for a historical basis to exclude fee awards from sovereign immunity's reach in the first place

197. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); see Nagata, supra note 1, at
1197-1202.
198. Rowe, supra note 90, at 653.
199. DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 61, 1.02[1] ("[Sihould an award of attorney's fees
be considered an element of costs or an element of damages? Is a request for fees
ancillary to the case on the merits, or an integral part of the dispute itself? ... No
definitive answers can be given to these questions without consideration of the
specific context of the fee claim within the action .... Indeed, the very same fee
award may even be considered costs for one purpose in the action and damages
for some other purpose. The attorney's fee is much more chameleon-like than
most other forms of monetary relief." (footnotes omitted)).
200. This section could have been called "Are Fees the Problem?", but the onus is on
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), as a theory of what remedies should be
available against states, to account for all three of the major categories of remedies. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
201. Hutto v. Finney is an example of a case that upheld both types of awards. 437
U.S. 678, 689 (1978) (bad faith); id. at 693 (§ 1988).
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The Hood and Katz Methodological Twists

The three approaches above have difficulty using Edelman and
Seminole Tribe to arrive at an answer. One might conclude that those
problems preclude any clear conceptual resolution. Fortunately, the
Court has tweaked its methodology when a bright-line approach
would otherwise wreak havoc on systems that the early practices of
the nation teach are inoffensive to states' sovereignty. The uniform
application of federal bankruptcy law seems to be the first area that
the Court has treated with this different approach. Whether these
cases are motivated by the paradigmatic pragmatism of the ounce-ofhistory-for-a-pound-of-logic maxim, a fealty to the original understanding 2 02 of the provisions at issue, or a genuinely unique history of
the Bankruptcy Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the methodology of these cases is useful.
In Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, the Court dealt
with a bankrupt's effort to obtain a discharge from a debt she owed to
Tennessee. 20 3 Rather than address the question for which certiorari
was granted-the ability of Congress to abrogate a state's immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause-the Court focused on a condition precedent to Seminole Tribe: The existence of a suit against a state for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment (the Edelman inquiry).2 04 The
Court concluded that even though the bankruptcy court employed an
"adversary proceeding," that proceeding was essentially in rem. 2 05
From historical sources in admiralty and maritime law, the Court concluded that in rem actions could not be considered "suits" against a
state, despite the Eleventh Amendment's proscription of all suits "in
law or equity."206
Bankruptcy's expansive power to hear suits, not just to enter discharges, prevented the Court from avoiding the question on which it
granted certiorari in Hood. In Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz, the Court used a detailed historical analysis of the Bankruptcy
Clause to conclude that "[i]nsofar as orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts' in rem jurisdiction . . . implicate States' sovereign immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not
202. I do not use this term in its strict sense. See William Michael Treanor, Taking
Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 488 n.1 (2007). Rather, I use it
simply as a description of an approach focused on historical evidence about the
period of the framing. Sometimes that takes the form of an investigation into
original intent and sometimes into original understanding.
203. 541 U.S. 440, 445 (2004).
204. Id. at 446 ("States, nonetheless, may still be bound by some judicial actions without their consent.").
205. Id. at 452.
206. Id. 446, 452-54.
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to assert that immunity.207 This allowed the bankruptcy court to disgorge a preferential transfer from the state treasury, 208 a remedy that
approximates a damage award.
Katz represents a much more dramatic methodological break from
Seminole Tribe than does Hood.209 There are relatively few phyla into
which courts still classify the nature of their jurisdiction (in personam,
in rem, and possibly quasi-in rem). As a methodological matter, Hood
is consistent with the (ostensibly) bright line approaches of Edelman
and Seminole Tribe-Hood simply carved out a readily identifiable
and discretely defined set of actions from Edelman's general rule, and
that mooted the Seminole Tribe question. As a practical fit, an exemption from the Eleventh Amendment for an exercise of in rem jurisdiction that dissolves an obligation, but does not meddle directly with
existing funds in a state's control, is entirely consistent within
Edelman's reasoning. Edelman permits injunctions, which cost something in the future (like the write-off for a discharged loan), but bars
damage awards, which take funds out of the state treasury (like a disgorgement). Hood is a limited circumvention of Seminole Tribe
21 0
through Edelman.
The methodology and holding of Katz are irreconcilable with
Edelman and Seminole Tribe, however. As a methodological matter,
Katz is in tension with the bright-line approach of Seminole Tribe.
Now there is no principled reason why every pre-Eleventh Amendment power should not be vulnerable to the type of historical deconstruction that the Court applied to the Bankruptcy Clause. And, on
the practical fit, Katz cannot avoid outright inconsistency with Seminole Tribe and Edelman. After Seminole Tribe, Edelman means that
awarding money from a state's treasury, unless it is "ancillary" to prospective relief, is prohibited except for a post-Eleventh Amendment
claim. Katz attempted to bootstrap the "ancillary" argument by noting that disgorgements of preferential transfers are ancillary to the
exercise of in rem jurisdiction, something that is inoffensive to a
state's sovereignty under Hood. In doing so the Court ignored the fact
that the very thing which made Hood inoffensive to sovereignty was
207. 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006).
208. Id. at 378-79.
209. I am not the first to highlight the general concerns about Hood and Katz identified below. The dissents in both cases were vigorous and a substantial amount of
scholarship has been devoted to the cases. See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, The Supreme Court's Confusing State Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,56 DRAKE L.
REV. 253 293-301 (2008); Susan E. Hauser, Necessary Fictions: Bankruptcy JurisdictionAfter Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1202-14 (2008).
210. It probably did not hurt that the phylum of actions Hood excepted is, today, less
likely than in personam suits to subject states to large liabilities. In rem proceedings are exceedingly rare outside of bankruptcy and admiralty.
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the absence of interference with money the state already had in the
bank.
Perhaps what is bad for Seminole Tribe and Edelman may nevertheless be good for fee-shifting statutes. Hood, however, does not live
up to the promise. First, the black-letter law of Hood is no help because fee awards must be exercises of in personam jurisdiction-the
court exercises jurisdiction over a person, not a res, when it orders
payment of fees. Second, Hood's methodology is of little help. Although fees and damages, like the nature of a court's jurisdiction, are
historically (and presently) categorized separately, 2 11 no historical
hook like the sovereign immunity exception for in rem admiralty actions exists to draw a meaningful distinction between the two categories for Eleventh Amendment purposes. If the distinction in
nomenclature alone were more than a historical artifact or arbitrary
convention, the problem would already be solved; there would be no
need to look further than whatever relevant lines of cases drew the
distinction between damages and fees for sovereign immunity purposes in the first place.
The best Hood-type argument is a general one: Hood teaches that
if a statute furthers a federal, historically important scheme, then the
Court is willing to craft an exception to the Eleventh Amendment
when the exception can be cabined. Just as there is a discrete number
of phyla into which jurisdiction can be classified, remedies break down
into easily identifiable categories: equitable relief, legal relief, and
costs, fees, and sanctions. 2 12 Whatever exotic species of relief exist
within each concept, exempting one of these categories as a whole
would not present intractable problems of classification-particularly
when the two groups other than the one that includes fee awards have
well established Eleventh Amendment consequences. That use of
Hood would do no violence to its methodological consistency with Seminole Tribe-the rule is a bright line. But this use begs the question.
Without history like the in rem admiralty cases as background, there
is no principled method to select between allowing and barring fee
awards. Either option draws an equally bright line.
The historical approach of Katz is more promising, but does not
give an unambiguously clear answer. Before discussing the history,
there is a preliminary objection to Katz's methodology that possibly
accounts for it- irremediable tension with Edelman and Seminole
Tribe. Even if a clear historical message exists on one class of issues
in sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the use of original intent on a
7.04[2].
211. DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 61,
212. You could add to this list, for example, by classifying punitive damages as a distinctive category of remedies. It would, however, be difficult to cut the list down
much further other than by rolling costs and fees into one of the other categories,
which would merely assume the answer to the question in this Article.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1

specific issue is problematic because no clear original intent pervades
all of sovereign immunity generally.
If history enlightened us about every sovereign immunity issue,
then the use of original intent to flesh out each individual issue would
enhance doctrinal coherence (at least as originally intended). When
we can derive a general framework or guiding principle for a constitutional idea from historical sources, but lack documentary evidence of
the original intent on a few class of issues, doctrinal coherence is
harder to obtain, but still possible-there is evidence that some organizing principle informs the original intent about the idea. Otherwise, we would have been unable to figure out, and find historical
sources to support, the general framework initially. However, when
an entire notion is hopelessly confused, all original intent can offer is a
grab bag of disjointed, and possibly conflicting, answers to discrete issues-the amalgamation of which may have precluded creating a coherent scheme for the entire topic in the first place. This overstates
the case, of course, but the history of sovereign immunity is a particularly poor candidate for divining rods. The concept is technical and
very slippery, the phrase appears nowhere in the Constitution itself,
and the Eleventh Amendment, the only possible textual basis for the
concept, bars only suits grounded in diversity. The Court is prone to
leave the concept's contours somewhat fuzzy: "The States thus retain
'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty" or the states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty." 2 13 Then, of course,
there was an interpretation of Article III almost contemporaneous
with the framing that held the states surrendered the traditional notion of sovereign immunity, which interpretation was then almost immediately overturned by the Eleventh Amendment. 2 14 The starting
point for modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence is a case, the logic
of which is subjected to perennial attack,215 decided over 100 years
2
after the Constitution was ratified. 16
Putting that skepticism to one side, a footnote in Alyeska 2 17 provides a good analysis of the history of fee awards and Fairmont
213.
214.
215.
216.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793).
See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 66 at 1297.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1890). Certain constitutional provisions
that got off to a late start still have a discernable intent. For example, although
it took close to a century and a half for the Court to seriously interpret the First
Amendment, the notion that the Framers would disapprove of a congressionally
established state church is pretty clear from the text and historical documents.
In contrast, the framing generation could not agree about the type of jurisdiction
or constitutional provision under which the states could be sued, and the issue
whether states could be sued at all nearly caused a constitutional crisis.
217. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267 n.42 (1975).
For a comprehensive and enlightening overview of the patchwork of theories,
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Creamery Co. v.Minnesota2 18 provides a good history of taxable costs
in its comprehensive survey covering the period from 1860-1927. In
Alyeska, the Court credited a comment by the United States Code's
Reviser that "a sovereign is not liable for costs unless specific provision for such liability is made by law." 21 9 That statement cuts both
ways. On the one hand, it makes immunity from fee awards seem like
an incident of sovereignty. That conclusion is buttressed when the
structure of the early statutes is considered. They permitted costshifting, but specifically excluded attorneys' fees as costs taxable
against the United States. 220 On the other hand, the statement
clearly contemplates the power of Congress to provide for attorneys'
fees. But, the crucial link to an original understanding of the question
in this Article is missing. I have found no cases, statutes, or texts
from the period of the framing that connect Congress's power to waive
the United States' immunity from fee awards to Congress's power to
abrogate states' immunity from the same. 22 1 Fairmont Creamery
comes the closest,22 2 but it identifies practices dating only to 1849,
and Alyeska's historical evidence draws a contrast between the taxing
of costs to states, which may be a practice that the framers countenanced, and fee awards against states, for which none of the early
statutes provided. 2 23
E.

Summary

On balance, and without any other clear guidance, I think that the
dicta in Maher, illuminated by at least one constitutionally indistinguishable practice for which old-if not framing generation-evidence
exists, is the best conceptual solution to the problem of attorneys' fee
awards against states after Seminole Tribe. I also think that the torturous path to that conclusion answers more than the narrow question
about attorneys' fees. Cases like Seminole Tribe, which upend longstanding and interconnected congressional schemes while reshaping
fundamental doctrines, can be more objectionable conceptually than a

218.
219.
220.
221.

222.

223.

rules, and statutes that were used to make fee awards at the time of the framing,
see generally DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 61, 1 1.02[1].
275 U.S. 70, 77 (1927).
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 267 n.42.
See id.
There isa general that cases about the sovereignty of the Urited States are
relevant to the states' sovereign immunity. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1998). At most that proves the same immunity enjoyed by
the United States devolved onto the states. It still does not address abrogation.
Most other cases focus on fee awards in litigation between two states. See, e.g.,
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 583, 583-84 (1924); Missouri v. Iowa, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 660, 681 (1849). Two-state cases are not relevant to this inquiry
because a separate textual abrogation of states' sovereign immunity from suit
applies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 266 n.42.
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macro-level critique reveals. The shouting match about Seminole
Tribe's obvious holding-it significantly curtails congressional power
to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity-looks like it presents, at
first glance, two plausible and readily comprehensible schools of
thought about which there can be reasonable disagreements on first
principles. The consequences at the periphery and on the micro-level
reveal that the two positions are not equally balanced, at least as a
matter of doctrinal coherence.
VI.

FINAL THOUGHTS: STRATEGIC, PRACTICAL,
AND CONCEPTUAL

From the above, it is hard to see a clear path out of the conceptual
thicket. The considerations that I identify below as practical influences on the outcome of the attorneys' fee question are a good deal
easier to grasp, but, as with most ideological issues, much harder to
handle.
A.

Judicial Antipathy Towards §§ 1983 and 1988

The standard trope for a conclusion to an Article about civil
rights2 24 today goes something like this: The Supreme Court will answer the question reserved in Maher by holding that awards of attorneys' fees are barred by the states' sovereign immunity when the
underlying claims asserted relate to pre-Eleventh Amendment constitutional provisions and statutes. The antipathy of the Rehnquist
Court to litigation generally, and to civil rights litigation and its feeshifting statutes in particular, is not a well-kept secret. 22 5 Professor
224. I use this term loosely because, as demonstrated throughout the Article, a central
tension between pre-Eleventh Amendment causes of action and Seminole Tribe is
the non-civil-rights character of the claims. It was the channeling of all federal
law into a classical civil rights statute that Justice Powell labeled "unprecedented" and ignorant of "the lessons of history, logic, and policy." Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 12, 33 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). I do not have a hard
time considering the Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D.
Okla. 2006), plaintiffs' full faith and credit claim a species of "civil rights" litigation, whether or not brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps neither
would Justice Powell-he seemed most concerned that the majority was creating
causes of action for every federal statute, no matter how absurdly unrelated to
any concept of civil rights, under a cause of action unquestionably enacted for
violations of the classical notion of civil rights. Likewise, my concern is that Seminole Tribe may bar fee awards for every pre-Eleventh Amendment cause of action. In any event, if actual civil rights litigation (equal protection cases and the
like) is out of favor, see infra note 225 and accompanying text, there is no reason
to believe that pseudo-civil-rights litigation will fare much better.
225. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning the explosive growth of § 1983 litigation); Andrew M. Siegel,
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in
the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1136-37 (2006)
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Andrew Siegel has described the Rehnquist Court's approach to attorneys' fees as "paying heed to Congress's notes while missing its
tone." 2 26 That tone deafness causes Siegel to conclude disquietingly
that "the very same Justices who express unease at implying or imposing judicially constructed remedies are perfectly sanguine about
implying or imposing judicially constructed limitations on democratically enacted remedies." 2 2 7 The gnashing of teeth usually ends with
an observation that there is not much reason to suspect that the Rob228
erts Court will treat civil rights litigation any differently.
I, for one, am not convinced that fee-shifting will be so unceremoniously cast asunder or that such cynicism is justified. The aftershocks
of Seminole Tribe on such seemingly unrelated matters as student
loan programs have forced the Court to employ a nuanced reading of
the case's putatively sweeping scope. Even if the ideological undercurrents of Seminole Tribe are unmistakable, the Court has already been
clear that the case does not always mean what it says. In Hood,229 the
Court inched away from one disruptive (but foreseeable) consequence
of Seminole Tribe. Two years later, the Court reversed gears entirely
in Katz, at least for the Bankruptcy Clause.230 Like many seminal
decisions, Seminole Tribe is being pared back. That circumscription of
the case and the palpably favorable attitude towards fee shifting in
the background cases like Fitzpatrick,231 Hutto,232 Maher,233 and
Jenkins,234 are important countervailing forces to any general hostility towards civil rights litigation.
B. The Tenth or the Eleventh Amendment?
The proxy battle over the permissibility of congressional regulation
of the states qua states through the commerce power also deserves
mention. Removing the market incentive to bring suits for injunctive
relief, combined with the unavailability of damage awards, makes
suits to enforce federal laws other than those enacted under the Section 5 power practically unavailable to many plaintiffs without the

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

("Over the last two decades, the Rehnquist Court has handed down a series of
decisions that have chipped away at the availability of attorney's fees for civil
rights plaintiffs .... These decisions ...demonstrate both literal and theoretical
hostility to litigation.").
Siegel, supra note 225, at 1139.
Id. at 1130.
See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of
ConstitutionalLaw, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1553-59 (2008).
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 443 (2004).
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372 (2006).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976).
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978).
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 278 (1989).
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help of advocacy organizations. Congressional regulation of states in
all areas other than around classical civil rights would become essentially dead letter, at least under the "private attorneys general"
model. 235 This is certainly a coherent, if circuitous, way to approach
the availability of attorneys' fees. The result of such an approach,
however, would be just as strange as has been that of the Court's
proxy battle over the award of damages. 2 36 Rather than returning to
the National League of Cities-era, during which states were given a
free hand in their traditional zones of activity, the states would be
given a free hand to act contrary to federal law regardless of how
avant-garde the activity is, yet any action-traditional or otherwisethat touches on the equal protection and due process provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment would potentially impose both damages and
attorneys' fees on the state. Such a result might be consistent with
the view that the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are indeed special, and their impact on state sovereign immunity extraordinary, but it would not necessarily be consistent with the view of
National League of Cities.2 3 7 Even if half a Tenth Amendment is better than none, this back and forth would be a disjointed method of
38
advancing a coherent vision of federalism.2
C.

The Conceptual Value of the Problem

Putting aside those musings about the political issues surrounding
the Tenth Amendment, the currents of Seminole Tribe, and the attitude towards civil rights litigation, the problems created by a resurgent and robust version of sovereign immunity for the support
structure underlying § 1983 litigation, and many other general congressional schemes, have not been adequately addressed by the courts
and scholars. 23 9 The complexities that Seminole Tribe produces at the
macro-level of civil rights litigation and sovereign immunity generally-whether conceptually, practically, or as a matter of history235. There is no constitutional bar to suits that seek to compel compliance with federal law brought by the federal government against states. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
237. Barring fee awards could also provide a back-door method of revisiting Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23, 34-37 (1980), by disincentivizing only those suits not
properly thought of as civil rights actions. Such an attitude would produce a coherent approach to the problem, even if barring fees could not completely remedy
any perceived error in Thiboutot.
238. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 S. CT. REV. 1, 62 (after discussing National League of Cities, noting that
"[t]wo centuries after the Founding, [this situation] is a curious and unstable
place for the last stand of state sovereignty").
239. See supra section III.C.
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have been well developed. 2 40 As the case grows older, the initial objections have grown somewhat stale-whether as a function of their
empirical predictions or the perhaps inevitable decline in the persuasiveness of an exhaustively developed and debated idea. We have begun to take the broad contours of Seminole Tribe's radical view of
sovereign immunity for granted. The next wave of scholarship should
explore the micro-level consequences of the opinion. For example, if
we find that we can live without fee-shifting regimes for pre-Eleventh
Amendment causes of action, or that Seminole Tribe does not interfere
with them, then today's sovereign immunity revolution might have
gotten the federalism balance right. If we find that we cannot, critiques of Seminole Tribe at the macro-level will be enriched as our understanding deepens. At a minimum, rigorous testing of concepts like
Edelman's catch-all notion of permissible "ancillary" monetary relief
can reveal hidden methodological problems, which in turn provide
new ways of thinking about sovereign immunity as a whole.
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